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CONSTRUCTING C O M P E T E N C E : FORMULATING 
STANDARDS O F LEGAL C O M P E T E N C E T O MAKE 
MEDICAL DECISIONS 
Jessica Wilen Berg, J.D. 
Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D. & Thomas Grisso, Ph.D.* 
A young woman twenty-six weeks pregnant and dying from 
cancer lies heavily sedated and attached to a respirator. Is she 
competent to determine what life-prolonging measures should 
be taken, or to consent to an emergency cesarean section that 
may save her fetus but will probably shorten her life?1 A 
quadriplegic young man wishes to end his life and requests a 
court order granting immunity for the medical staff who will 
unhook his respirator and administer sedatives. Is he compe-
tent to choose to die?2 A delusional man wanders into a psy-
chiatric hospital and believes he is entering heaven rather 
than a hospital. Is he "too crazy" to admit himself voluntari-
ly?3 As these cases indicate, questions of decisionmaking com-
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1. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 1990) (en banc). 
2. See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990). 
3. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 114 (1990); Steven K. Hoge, On 
Being "Too Crazy" to Sign Into a Mental Hospital: The Issue of Consent 
to Psychiatric Hospitalization, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 
345 
346 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.48:345 
petence are inescapable in medicine today. A person's compe-
tence will have implications for whether he or she is allowed to 
decide what type of treatment, if any, is received; whether 
treatment is discontinued, including life-sustaining treatment; 
and whether medical professionals implementing decisions are 
exposed to civil or criminal liability. 
The notion of competence in the medical context stems from 
the law of informed consent,4 which has evolved over the past 
three decades into a complex doctrine designed to promote 
patients' autonomous decisionmaking.5 Autonomy requires 
that the patient be offered an active role in the decisionmaking 
process.6 This principle recognizes that although physicians 
have technical expertise, patients have an essential knowledge 
of their own subjective values and are the best judges of their 
own interests.7 There is also an intrinsic value in autonomy; 
even if an outside expert is better able to make a decision, it is 
preferable to allow a competent individual to make his or her 
own choices.8 Embedded in the philosophical notion of autono-
my are concrete requirements of capacity.9 To the extent that 
431, 432 (1994). 
4. Informed consent is a legal construct. Much of the jurisprudence 
in this area has focused on the elements of disclosure, i.e., the amount 
and type of information that must be imparted to the patient. Valid 
informed consent also requires an element of voluntariness, or absence of 
coercion, and a competent patient. See Alan Meisel et al., Toward a 
Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
285, 286-87 (1977) (describing the development of the doctrine of in-
formed consent); PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL 
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 23 (1987). 
5. See generally RUTH R. PADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY 
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); Meisel et al., supra note 4, 
at 286; APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4. 
6. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 297, 343 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(citing American Hospital Association statement supporting premise that 
"the controlling decision belongs to a competent, informed patient"). 
7. See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR 
OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 29 (1989); Charles 
W. Lidz & Robert M. Arnold, Rethinking Autonomy in Long Term Care, 
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 603, 605 (1993) (allowing patients to select their 
own treatment maximizes their best interest). 
8. Lidz & Arnold, supra note 7, at 605 (suggesting people are better 
judges of their own interest than the most benevolent outsider). 
9. E. Haavi Morreim, Competence: At the Intersection of Law, Medi-
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a patient's capacity is impaired with respect to abilities neces-
sary to exercise autonomy, that person is less able to partici-
pate competently in the decisionmaking process.10 
Presently there is a lack of both an authoritative framework 
for thinking about legal competence and clear standards for 
determining it. Cases and statutes generally lack sufficient 
analysis of competence and its different elements. Terms such 
as "understanding" or "rationality" may be poorly defined and 
used indiscriminately.11 Even when a statute articulates a 
cine, and Philosophy, in COMPETENCY: A STUDY OF INFORMAL COMPETEN-
CY DETERMINATIONS IN PRIMARY CARE 93, 93-125 (Mary Ann Gardell 
Cutter & Earl E. Shelp eds. 1991). Autonomy enables a person to "exam-
ine even his naturally given needs and desires and choose whether to 
identify with them, shun them, or pursue them." Id. at 101. This re-
quires the person to form a "coherent picture of the world and of his 
place in it." Id. In addition, it is "essential tha t the autonomous person 
be generally rational in his thinking and judging processes." Id. Even 
John Stuar t Mill apparently recognized that limitations on liberty are 
warranted when a person is "delirious or in some state of excitement or 
absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty." John 
Monahan, John Stuart Mill on the Liberty of the Mentally III: A Histori-
cal Note, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1428, 1429 (1977) (citing J .S. MILL, ON 
LIBERTY (1859)). 
10. Competency and autonomy, however, are not synonymous. While 
autonomy refers to the capacity to make independent decisions in gener-
al, competence refers to the ability to perform a particular task. Morreim, 
supra note 9, at 102; Tom Beauchamp, Competence, in COMPETENCY: A 
STUDY OF INFORMAL COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS IN PRIMARY CARE 49, 
61 (Mary Ann Gardell Cutter & Earl E. Shelp eds. 1991); cf. Lidz & Ar-
nold, supra note 7, at 608-19 (identifying three academic models of au-
tonomy, including total independence, free action, and effective delibera-
tion, and proposing a fourth model: consistency with one's values and life 
goals). The authors argue tha t autonomy should not always be centered 
around discrete decisionmaking models. For example, in nursing homes 
autonomy should focus on the "relationship between patients ' lives and 
their goals and commitments." Lidz & Arnold, supra note 7, at 607. Com-
petence and autonomy largely overlap in medical decisionmaking because 
the focus is on "the patient's competence to do one basic task, namely, to 
make autonomous decisions regarding his medical situation." Morreim, 
supra note 9, at 102. The capacities needed to be able competently to 
make a decision are necessary but not always sufficient to be able auton-
omously to make a decision (e.g., autonomy may be impaired by the 
application of coercive pressure on an otherwise competent person). 
11. See, e.g., Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to 
348 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.48:345 
standard of competence, it is often vague and provides little 
guidance for those who must apply it. For example, what de-
gree of incapacity suffices to establish incompetence under an 
"understanding" standard? How much understanding is neces-
sary and what does the patient need to be able to understand? 
Do different situations warrant the application of different 
standards or the demonstration of different levels of ability? 
The first Part of this Article provides a conceptual clarifica-
tion of legal competence and identifies a framework of four 
relevant abilities that are elements of competence standards. It 
offers a uniform vocabulary derived from competence standards 
found in cases and statutes and proposes a framework for 
characterizing four abilities associated with legal competence 
to make medical decisions. Part II describes the MacArthur 
Treatment Competence Study, which developed instruments to 
evaluate capacity based upon the four abilities and applied 
them to three patient populations: patients suffering from 
angina pectoris, severe depression and schizophrenia. Finally, 
Part III examines the policy implications of the foregoing em-
pirical analysis for future reforms of the law on competence. 
I. LEGAL STANDARDS OF COMPETENCE 
Competence is a legal construct:12 in most jurisdictions only 
a court can decide if a person is incompetent.13 Assessments 
of capacity,14 on the other hand, are relegated to medical or 
Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280 (1977) (listing a number of 
terms which are used in judicial decisions and statutes "interchangeably 
without sufficient explanation or clear behavioral referents"). Although 
there has been some improvement, this continues to be true today. 
12. "Competence" is used here in its legal sense. There is a vast psy-
chological and social science literature in which the term may be used 
differently. 
13. See, e.g., Kristine C. Karnezis, Annotation, Patient's Right to Re-
fuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R. 3d 67, 70-
71 (1979) (stating that due to questions of competency, cases where life-
saving medical treatment is refused are brought to the courts). 
14. "Capacity," as used here, refers to a patient's present level of 
decisionmaking ability, or likely ability when faced with a future situa-
tion requiring a decision. A determination of incapacity has no direct 
legal consequences, although it may lead to an eventual determination of 
incompetence. There may, however, be practical consequences of a 
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mental health professionals. Legislatures, in drafting compe-
tence statutes, may determine what type and degree15 of clini-
cally assessed incapacity will allow a judge to declare an indi-
vidual legally "incompetent." Theories of competence to make 
medical decisions focus on various criteria, the most common of 
which, and the ones adopted by the law, are cognitive.16 Al-
though the law focuses on cognitive impairments, there are no 
uniform standards among the jurisdictions to identify the rele-
vant abilities that, when impaired, constitute incompetence. 
A number of authors have proposed different conceptualiza-
tions of the abilities that should be incorporated into compe-
tence standards.17 Their diverse approaches contribute to the 
physician's determination that a patient cannot make decisions (e.g., the 
physician may ask a family member to make decisions on the patient 's 
behalf). A determination of incompetence, on the other hand, brings with 
it a number of legal restrictions (e.g., the incompetent person will be 
legally prohibited from making certain decisions). 
15. Legislatures often do not specify the degree of incapacity (except, 
perhaps, in broad terms such as "substantial" or "minimal") required for 
a finding of incompetence and instead leave the decision to the courts or 
to clinicians. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text on the dis-
tinction between rules and standards. 
16. But see Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psychotropic Medica-
tion: Three Alternatives to the Law's Cognitive Standard, Al U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 689, 692-94 (1993). Professor Saks analyzes three models: the differ-
ent person test, the volitional impairment test, and the product of mental 
illness test. See id. at 692. She concludes that the law's cognitive stan-
dard is the most attractive, but tha t additional attention should be paid 
to alternative theories to clarify the issues surrounding competence. See 
id. at 694; Lawrence Hipshman, Defining a Clinically Useful Model for 
Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSY-
CHIATRY & L. 235, 239 (1987) (proposing a "therapeutic alliance" stan-
dard, i.e., whether a patient is able to work with a doctor regarding 
treatment); Harold J. Bursztajn et al., Beyond Cognition: The Role of 
Disordered Affective States in Impairing Competence to Consent to 
Treatment, 19 BULL. A M . ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 383, 384 (1991) (sug-
gesting an affective dimension to competence). 
17. See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. 
L. REV. 945 passim (1991). Professor Saks identifies four categories: pure 
understanding, modified understanding, understanding and belief, and full 
reasoning. Under the "pure understanding" test, a patient must be able 
to assimilate the information tha t the caregiver provides. See id. at 952. 
A "modified understanding" test, by contrast, requires tha t a patient not 
only comprehend the information, but also believe that the doctor be-
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lieves it. Id. at 952-54. With regard to the "understanding and belief 
category, Saks also differentiates between what she refers to as a "naive" 
test (a patient must comprehend the information and believe the informa-
tion) and a "sophisticated" test (a patient must comprehend the informa-
tion and form no "patently false beliefs"). See id. at 955-56. As Saks her-
self admits, the sophisticated understanding and belief test suffers from 
the need to establish what beliefs are "patently false." Id. at 965. She at-
tempts to define patently false as encompassing beliefs supported by no 
evidence. See id. Saks defines "full reasoning" as requiring a greater ca-
pacity to assess evidence than the "understanding and belief" test and 
focuses on the integrity of the "reasoning process." Id. at 957. Integrity is 
not defined. Saks merely notes that "the 'full reasoning' view requires 
fairly intact reasoning ability." Id. Although Saks' categorizations are 
closely linked to language found in cases and statutes, they do not ade-
quately distinguish between different capacities. For example, her "sophis-
ticated understanding and belief test is a compound standard that en-
compasses various abilities, none of which is adequately identified. As a 
result, it is difficult to translate her legal competence requirements into 
cognitive abilities that health professionals can evaluate. 
The British Law Commission likewise only broadly defines different 
capacities. In a 1995 report it defined an incapacitated person as one 
who is "(1) unable by reason of a mental disability to make a decision on 
the matter in question or (2) unable to communicate a decision on that 
matter because he or she is unconscious or for any other reason." THE 
BRITISH LAW COMMISSION REPORT NO. 231, MENTAL INCAPACITY 32-41 
(1995) [hereinafter LAW COMM'N]. The Commission defines the first re-
quirement as encompassing both the ability to understand information 
relevant to the decision and the ability to use the information in making 
a decision. See id. at 37. The latter concept—ability to use the informa-
tion—seems to include the ability to process information logically as well 
as to acknowledge its relevance to one's own circumstances. Id. at 38-39. 
Further explanation of the understanding requirement shows that it, too, 
is intended to cover both factual understanding of information and the 
patient's appreciation of its relevance to one's own situation. Thus a 
number of different abilities are integrated into two articulated stan-
dards. The result is confusing: how does one evaluate an individual who 
understands all relevant information and is able to process it in a ratio-
nal manner, but refuses treatment for schizophrenia because he does not 
believe he is mentally ill, and believes instead that "his brain has been 
blackened"? See In re Witthans, No. CX-94-280, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 
934, at *2 (Sept. 27, 1994) (unpublished). Clearly this person fails to 
appreciate the nature of his illness and the likely consequences of refus-
ing treatment although he may factually understand the situation and 
employ logical reasoning to arrive at his decision. 
Other commentators have defined competence differently. See THOM-
AS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 2 (1986) (describing some of the 
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confusion surrounding competence. Nevertheless, a review of 
American cases discloses a reasonably coherent set of ap-
proaches. Following the pioneering work of Loren Roth et al. in 
this area,18 Paul Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso identified 
four potential components of competence standards: (i) ability 
to communicate a choice, (ii) ability to understand relevant 
information, (hi) ability to appreciate the nature of the situa-
tion and its likely consequences, and (iv) ability to manipulate 
information rationally.19 Although the four-part framework 
was suggested in previous literature, this Article reviews cases 
and statutes to show that the components are actually reflect-
ed in, and in fact drawn from, the law.20 Thus it provides a 
unique perspective—no other commentator has undertaken an 
extensive examination of existing law in relation to the ele-
ments of proposed competence standards.21 The following sec-
different approaches); BECKY COX WHITE, COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 154 
(1994) (defining the capacities necessary for competence to include the 
ability to process information in various specific ways in order to make a 
choice). 
18. Roth et al., supra note 11. 
19. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capaci-
ties to Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1635-36 
(1988) [hereinafter NEJM]; Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental Illness and Competence 
to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 110 (1995) Dierein-
after MacArthur I\. State statutes and cases may use one or a combina-
tion of these components to establish competence. 
20. The cases and statutes cited herein are categorized according to 
which of the four components are explicitly articulated. This is not to 
imply that the standard(s) for which the cases or statutes are cited are 
the only ones in use in the jurisdiction in question. On the contrary, the 
standard articulated is likely to have been tailored to the particular 
facts, and the proliferation of compound standards found in statutes is 
evidence that more than one test is applied. "Standard" may be used 
here to refer either to one of the four components or criteria, or to some 
combination of those elements (i.e., a "compound standard"). The terms 
"test" and "measure" are used to refer to the MacArthur instruments (see 
infra Par ts II and III), or the MacCAT-T (see infra note 148 and accom-
panying text). 
21 . There are only three or four compound standards actually found in 
the cases and statutes: (i) choice and understanding; (ii) choice, under-
standing and appreciation; (iii) choice, understanding, appreciation and 
reasoning; or (iv) choice, understanding and reasoning. This final stan-
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tions will discuss each of the four elements in turn.22 
A. Ability to Communicate a Choice 
We define this least stringent component applied by courts 
and legislatures as an inability to reach or communicate a 
decision. The first aspect, inability to reach a decision, is dem-
onstrated by a patient who simply cannot make up his or her 
mind or vacillates to such a degree that it is impossible to 
implement a treatment choice. Inability to communicate a 
decision means that the patient is unable effectively to make 
known his or her wishes regarding treatment. Many courts use 
dard is relatively rare. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. Courts 
that explicitly articulate some other combination of components are either 
implicitly applying additional elements or tailoring the discussion of com-
petence to the facts of the case. 
22. One criterion missing from the above components focuses on the 
reasonableness of the patient's choice. See, e.g., Roth et al., supra note 
11, at 280-81. Application of a standard based on this criterion may be 
unusually susceptible to the bias against an unpopular choice since rea-
sonability typically will be determined by comparison with the options 
that the majority of patients select. Id. at 281 (explaining that the stan-
dard is biased in favor of decisions to accept treatment); Saks, supra 
note 16, at 951-52 (arguing that a reasonable result standard frustrates 
the purposes of competency doctrine). Moreover, the standard is not nec-
essary to protect autonomy since autonomy focuses on the process of 
decisionmaking, not the outcome. But see Lidz & Arnold, supra note 7, at 
606-07 (noting alternative definitions of autonomy). Thus an autonomous 
choice is one that is the product of autonomous action, regardless of 
whether its result is "good" or "bad." Standards should focus on the 
decisionmaking process rather than the final decision. Likewise, compe-
tence determinations should address the capacity of the decisionmaker, 
not the reasonableness of the choice. See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 10, 
at 49-77 (arguing that "one who is competent to choose may not 
'competently choose," and therefore "the latter use of the word 
'competent' [should] be avoided"); cf Marc Stauch, Rationality and the 
Refusal of Medical Treatment: A Critique of the Recent Approach of the 
English Courts, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 162, 163-65 (1995) (making a distinc-
tion between non-rational reasons and irrational reasons, and arguing 
that an "irrational choice" to refuse life-saving treatment is grounds for 
incompetence). But see Andrew Pomerantz & Alexander de Nesnera, In-
formed Consent, Competency, and the Illusion of Rationality, 13 GEN. 
HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 138, 141-42 (1991) (emphasizing the need for careful 
competence assessments even when patients articulate rational reasons 
for their choices). 
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this element for a threshold determination of competence.23 
Thus patients who are comatose or in a persistent vegetative 
state are per se incompetent.24 Some courts have implicitly 
adopted this criterion by holding that an uncommunicative 
patient is incompetent.25 Used alone, this standard would of-
fer the greatest protection for individual decisionmaking rights 
because it focuses simply on communication and disregards the 
decisionmaking process. It would, however, allow a number of 
patients with poor decisionmaking capacity to make decisions. 
Although ability to communicate a choice may be a necessary 
component of competence, demonstration of this ability alone 
does not necessarily entail the capacity to make decisions au-
tonomously. Thus courts and legislatures have combined the 
communication component with one or more of the others.26 
B. Ability to Understand the Relevant Information 
The most common ability required by courts and legislatures 
in their competence standards focuses on the patient's compre-
hension of information related to the particular decision at 
hand.27 Understanding in this sense is simply the ability to 
23. In re Department of Veteran's Affairs Medical Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 
495, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (patient was delirious, semi-conscious, and inca-
pable of meaningful communication); In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (mentally retarded patient had limited communica-
tion skills); In re O'Brien, 517 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (describ-
ing patient as unable to communicate except through nods, gestures and 
pressing of hands). 
24. See, e.g., In re Estate of Loungeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (111. 
1989) ("Obviously, a patient who is irreversibly comatose or in a vegeta-
tive state will be incompetent, unable to communicate his intent."); Mor-
gan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he patient is 
incompetent, as the result of being comatose . . . and unable to make 
the decision."). 
25. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 
370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Mass. 1977) (accepting, without examination, find-
ing of lower court tha t mentally retarded patient, unable to speak, was 
incompetent). 
26. See infra notes 27 and 54. 
27. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 
1533 (D. Colo. 1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.Rptr. 297, 304 
(Ct. App. 1986); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 752-53 (D.C. 1979); In re J ane 
A., 629 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); McKay v. Bergstedt, 
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comprehend the concepts involved, especially in the informed 
consent disclosure; it does not require the patient to compre-
hend the situation as a whole. Thus we distinguish between 
understanding, and appreciation, which will be discussed in 
the following section. While courts and legislatures always 
include an understanding component, they often fail to define 
it. The common language found in statutes—"understand the 
nature and consequences"—may be interpreted to encompass 
both an understanding and appreciation component.28 Part III 
argues that although understanding and appreciation should 
both be included in a competence standard, they are distinct 
concepts that should be recognized independently. 
801 P.2d 617, 625-26 (Nev. 1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1240-41 
(N.J. 1985); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (N.J. 1981); In re Nemser, 
273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626-27 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 
431 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Miller v. Rhode Island Hosp., 625 A.2d 778, 
786 (R.I. 1993); In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Wis. 1994); In re 
Fadley, 205 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Ct. App. 1984); Aponte v. United States, 582 
F. Supp. 65 (D.P.R. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 66-402 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 32A-15 (b) (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5126.30 (Anderson 1994); 
Wis. STAT. § 51.61 (1994). 
28. See, e.g., In re Schiller, 372 A.2d 360, 367 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1977) (expressing the standard for capacity as understanding the 
condition, nature and effects of the proposed treatment, and its attendant 
risks); In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d 894, 895 (Wis. 1994) (interpreting the 
Wisconsin statutory standard for incompetence as inability to express "an 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting medica-
tion or treatment, and the alternatives to accepting the particular medi-
cation or treatment offered") (quoting text of Wis. STAT. § 51.61 (1994)). 
The court held that the standard did not require the patient to appreci-
ate the nature of her mental illness where administration of psychotropic 
drugs is at issue. See id. Thus the fact that the patient denied any ill-
ness or problem was irrelevant to the determination of competence. In re 
W.S., 377 A.2d 969 (Essex County Ct. 1977); In re Merrill, 531 N.Y.S.2d 
201 (Sup. Ct. 1988). CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1418.8(b) (West 
1995) (using language similar to Wisconsin statute and requiring ability 
to communicate); 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 158(9) (defining capacity to consent 
as understanding the nature and consequences of decisions); MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(l)(l) (1994) (defining capability to give in-
formed consent as ability to understand nature and consequences of deci-
sion and evaluate risks and benefits); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Michie 
1994) (same). 
1996] LEGAL COMPETENCE 355 
C. Ability to Appreciate the Nature of the Situation and its 
Likely Consequences 
This criterion requires that the patient be able to apply 
information that is understood in a context-neutral sense to his 
or her own situation. Therefore, it is most often combined with 
an understanding requirement.29 Patients who accept that 
their physicians believe they are ill, but deny that there is a 
problem in the face of objective30 evidence to the contrary, 
would fail this component.31 Thus in In re Roe,32 the Massa-
29. Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681, 685-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1994); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 326 (111. 1989); In re Roe, 583 N.E.2d 
1282, 1286 (Mass. 1992); Northwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 
1025 (Mass. 1991); In re Martin, 504 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1993); In re Riebel, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 942, at *4; In re Thornblad, 
1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 1218, at *9-10 (1991); In re Requena, 517 A.2d 
886, 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986); In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 
785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1978); In re W.S., 377 A.2d 969, 973 (Essex 
County Ct. 1977); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986); In re 
Rochester Gen. Hosp., 601 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1993); Belcher v. 
Charleston Area Medical Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (W. Va. 1992); In re 
Romero, 790 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:1 dV) 
(1994) (defining "capacity to make health care decisions"); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 23-06.5-02 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1) (1995) (defin-
ing a "competent person"); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
313.002(5) (West 1996) (defining "incapacitated"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 
3452(3) (1994) (defining "capacity to make health care decisions"). 
Even where there is no explicit understanding component in a case 
or statute, language referring to an appreciation component is usually 
interpreted to incorporate an understanding requirement. 
30. This may include evidence that the patient's symptoms correspond 
to generally accepted criteria for a specific diagnosis and corroborating 
opinions by other physicians. Some commentators may still find this 
insufficient. See, e.g., Virginia Abernethy, Compassion, Control, and Deci-
sions about Competency, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 53, 57 (1984) (stressing 
tha t hope for recovery in the face of physicians' pessimistic prognosis is 
not necessarily "a criterion of psychotic denial"). 
31 . People v. Delgado, 213 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124-25 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that the state must show that the use of psychotropic drugs is 
the least restrictive alternative available to treat a prisoner deemed un-
able to give informed consent due to his inability to perceive his mental 
illness); In re Roe, 583 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Mass. 1992) (holding that a 
ward of the state was incompetent to make an informed decision about 
his use of antipsychotic medication because, despite medical evidence to 
the contrary, the ward denied tha t he was mentally ill); Lane v. 
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chusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a man suffering 
from schizophrenia was incompetent because he refused to 
take his medication and because he denied he was mentally 
ill.33 The court deemed him incompetent since the denial pre-
vented him from "appreciating] the need to control his illness 
with antipsychotic medication," and "the risks associated with 
refusing it."34 On the other hand, refusal of potentially benefi-
cial, even life-saving, treatment does not necessarily indicate 
that a patient is incompetent. For example, in Lane v. 
Candura?5 a Massachusetts Appellate Court upheld the right 
of a woman to refuse amputation of a gangrenous leg.36 The 
court found that Ms. Candura appreciated the nature and 
consequences of her act because she accurately believed that 
she was suffering from gangrene and would likely die without 
surgery. 
The appreciation criterion recognizes that delusional beliefs 
properly affect competence determinations only to the extent 
that they affect the patient's ability to appreciate the relevance 
of information to his or her own circumstances.38 A patient 
Fiasconaro, 1995 WL 584522 (Mass. App. Div.); In re Witthans, No. CX-
94-280, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 934 (Sept. 27, 1994) (affirming order of 
trial court authorizing the involuntary use in neuroleptic medication for a 
patient who denied his mental illness despite medical evidence to the 
contrary); In re Muntner, 470 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) 
(same); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1)(B) (1995) (noting that denial of a 
disorder when faced with substantial evidence of its existence constitutes 
a failure of appreciation and is evidence of incompetence). 
An appreciation criterion does not require that the patient accept 
all of the doctor's beliefs as true. For example, the patient may disagree 
with the label used by the physician. Thus a person can accept that he 
is ill, but object to the specific diagnosis. For example, a patient can 
accept that he hears voices in his head and appreciate the need for med-
ication to stop the voices, but object to a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
32. 583 N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. 1992). 
33. Id. at 1288. 
34. Id at 1286. 
35. 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). 
36. Id. at 1236. 
37. Id. 
38. See George J. Annas & Jean E. Densberger, Competence to Refuse 
Medical Treatment: "Autonomy vs. Paternalism," 15 TOLEDO L. REV. 561, 
580 n.63 (1984) (explaining that in order to qualify under the insane 
delusion test, the delusion needs to be closely related to the subject mat-
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who refuses treatment because she thinks that massive discol-
oration of her leg is a result of dirt rather than an internal 
injury is not incompetent merely because she is delusional, but 
because she is unable—as a result of her delusions—to ade-
quately evaluate the consequences of refusing treatment. Un-
der the appreciation criterion, even quite unconventional be-
liefs do not negate competence as long as they do not interfere 
with the patient's ability to appreciate the nature of the situa-
tion and the likely effect of treatment. For example, in In Re 
Milton™ the patient refused treatment for cancer of the uter-
us because she preferred faith healing and believed (erroneous-
ly) that an evangelist, who claimed to be a faith healer, was 
her husband.40 The court distinguished between her delusion-
al belief regarding her marriage and her religious belief in 
faith healing, stating that the "belief in spiritual healing 
stands on its own, without regard to her delusion," and thus 
she had the capacity to make treatment decisions.41 In es-
sence, the court applied an appreciation criterion, since the 
patient recognized and accepted the fact that she was ill and 
that without treatment she would likely die.42 
D. Ability to Manipulate Information Rationally 
The ability to manipulate information rationally is the abili-
ty least often included in legal competence standards and it is 
the hardest to operationalize. It addresses the patient's reason-
ing capacity or ability to employ logical thought processes to 
compare the risks and benefits of treatment options. This crite-
rion does not look at the outcome of a decision, but, like under-
standing and appreciation, it is concerned with the patient's 
decisionmaking process. Thus, a patient who can understand, 
appreciate and communicate a decision may still be impaired 
because she is unable to process information logically, in accor-
dance with her preferences. Conversely, a patient may employ 
ter at issue). 
39. 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987). 
40. Id. at 256. 
41. Id. at 258. 
42. Milton is illustrative of the difficulty courts have in distinguishing 
between delusion and religious belief. Courts tend to err on the side of 
religion and are generally unwilling to challenge individual beliefs. 
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logical thought processes but base them on impaired under-
standing. Because of this, rational manipulation is never found 
alone and is always part of a compound legal standard. In 
Reise v. St. Mary's Hospital,43 for example, the court held that 
in addition to meeting the understanding and appreciation 
criteria, the patient must also demonstrate the ability to 
"knowingly and intelligently evaluate the information . . . and 
otherwise participate in the treatment decision by means of 
rational thought processes."44 In In re Conroy45 the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court held that a "patient may be incompetent 
because he lacks the ability to understand the information con-
veyed, to evaluate the options, or to communicate a deci-
sion."46 In reaching this conclusion, the court utilized under-
standing, rational manipulation and communication compo-
nents. 
Inclusion of rational manipulation in a legal standard of 
competence may seem troublesome because it could lead to 
incompetence adjudications based simply on the unconvention-
al ly of a patient's decisions.47 If the legal standard is sensibly 
applied, however, this fear is unwarranted. For example, in 
United States v. Charters48 the Fourth Circuit held that a 
"court should evaluate whether [a patient] has followed a ratio-
nal process in deciding to refuse antipsychotic medication and 
can give rational reasons for the choice he has made."49 
43. 243 Gal. Rptr. 241 (1987). 
44. Id. at 254; cf., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1)(C) (West 1995) (ex-
plicitly requiring that a patient have the capacity to participate in treat-
ment decisions by means of a rational thought process, in addition to the 
ability to understand and to appreciate). 
45. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
46. Id. at 1240. 
47. But see In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973) (holding that 
simply because a decision to refuse treatment appears irrational or fool-
ish does not mean the patient is incompetent); In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 
255, 256 (Ohio 1987) (reasoning that even though unusual, a patient's 
belief in faith healing was a valid religious tenet and could not be disre-
garded). 
48. 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987). 
49. Id. at 496. (It is not clear whether the Charters court actually 
applied the standard as stated.) See United States v. Waddell, 687 F. 
Supp. 208, 209 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (stating that to determine the 
defendant's competence the state should evaluate whether he followed a 
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E. Compound Standards 
Cases and statutes evidence a variety of combinations of the 
four components.50 It is difficult to know the extent to which 
rational process in deciding to reject medication and whether he can give 
a rational reason for his choice); United States v. Ballard, 704 F. Supp. 
620, 622 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (holding that the state had failed to prove tha t 
inmates were incompetent according to the Charters formula). 
As we define the rational manipulation criterion, a patient need not 
be able to give objectively "rational" reasons for her choice as long as she 
can demonstrate that the final decision follows logically from whatever 
reasons are offered. Cf. Benjamin Freedman, Competence, Marginal and 
Otherwise, 4 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 53 (1981) (noting tha t a "rational rea-
sons" test should focus on the process of decisionmaking, not the end re-
sult, and should require that the patient provide both acceptable premis-
es and a conclusion related to those premises). Thus, a patient who 
based her argument on false premises, or who failed to produce premises 
tha t support the conclusion, would fail this test. Our reasoning criterion 
would allow a patient to rest on any premises (even a false one) as long 
as the conclusion drawn follows logically from those premises. 
50. See Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1502-04 (D. Utah 
1993) (utilizing the understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation 
standards); In re Gordy, 658 A.2d 613, 617-18 (Del. Ch. 1994) (using the 
understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation standards); In re 
Osbourne, 294 A.2d 372, 375-76 (D.C. 1972) (applying the understanding, 
appreciation, and rational manipulation standards); In re Moe, 579 
N.E.2d 682, 685 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (adopting communication and 
rational manipulation standards); In re Lambert, 437 N.W.2d 106, 108 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (utilizing the understanding, appreciation and 
rational manipulation standards); In re Peterson, 446 N.W.2d 669, 673-74 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (employing the understanding, appreciation and 
rational manipulation standards); Gleason v. Abrams, 593 A.2d 1232, 
1235-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (using the understanding, appre-
ciation and rational manipulation standards); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 
1249-51 (D.C. 1990) (relying on the communication, understanding and 
rational manipulation standards); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410-13 
(N.J. 1987) (using the understanding and rational manipulation stan-
dards); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710-13 (Sup. Ct. 
1982) (articulating the understanding, appreciation and rational manipula-
tion standards); State Dep't. of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 
197, 209-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (utilizing the understanding, apprecia-
tion and rational manipulation standards), cert, denied, 575 S.W.2d 946 
(Tenn. 1978), and cert, denied, 436 U.S. 923 (1978); In re Beth Israel 
Medical Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512-13 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (employing the 
communication, understanding and rational manipulation standards); In 
re Waltz, 227 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1986) (understanding, appreciation, rational 
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decisions are being narrowly tailored to fit the facts of a case, 
and additional components may be used within the same juris-
diction in different situations.51 In addition, some cases and 
statutes clearly articulate one or two of the four elements but 
also use vague and broader language which could be interpret-
ed to include additional components. For example, in Thor v. 
Superior Court,62 the court stated that to be competent, the 
patient must have "the capacity to reason and make judg-
ments," "a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the 
proposed treatment alternatives," and "a full understanding of 
the nature of the disease and the prognosis."53 Although ap-
preciation is not mentioned by name, it appears by the latter 
statement that the court may have intended it to be a part of 
the competence assessment. On the other hand, the court sim-
ply may have wanted to stress the understanding requirement, 
rather than require that a patient be able to apply relevant 
information regarding the disease and prognosis to his or her 
own situation. Colorado defines incapacity to include someone 
who "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or 
communicate responsible decisions."54 The addition of the 
manipulation); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1) (West 1995) (adopting the 
understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation standards); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-66-20(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (relying on the com-
munication, appreciation and rational manipulation standards). See also 
supra note 21. 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 496-97 (4th Cir. 
1987) (articulating a rational manipulation criterion but noting that "it 
would not be a competent decision based on rational reasons if Charters 
refused medication out of a denial that he suffers from schizophrenia," 
seemingly referring to an appreciation criterion). 
52. 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993). 
53. Id. at 381. 
54. Co. REV. STAT. ANN. 26-3.1-101(1) (West 1995) (requiring commu-
nication and understanding); see also ALA. CODE § 26-2a-20(8) (1992); Az. 
REV. STAT. Ann. § 14-5105 (1995) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 (c) 
(1994) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327F-2 (1994) (same); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 34B, § 11001(F) (West Supp. 1995) (communication and under-
standing); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-5(j) (1993) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 25-03.1-18.1 (1995) (communication); OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 30, §1-111 
(West Supp. 1996) and tit. 43A, § 10-103 (West Supp. 1996) (same); WYO. 
STAT. § 35-20-102(a)(x) (1994) (communication and understanding). 
Other statutes refer to the ability to reach or make an "informed 
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term "responsible" could be interpreted to mean that the per-
son must be able to appreciate his or her illness, that the deci-
sion be reached by means of a rational thought process, or 
even that the final decision be conventional. Missouri requires 
that the person be able to "receive and evaluate information or 
. . . communicate decisions"55—possibly combining the under-
standing, rational manipulation and communication compo-
nents. Some statutes fail to define the terms with any specifici-
ty. For example, Utah defines "incapacitated person" as "any 
person whose decisionmaking process is impaired . . . to the 
extent that the person is unable to care for his or her personal 
safety or is unable to attend to and provide for such necessities 
as food, shelter, clothing and medical care"56—apparently 
decision." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-661 (1993) (also requiring under-
standing and appreciation); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/10 (Smith-
Hurd & Supp. 1995) (communication, understanding and appreciation); 
MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 201(D), §1 (1994) (understanding and apprecia-
tion); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26-.2H-55 (Supp. 1995) (same); 1995 N.M. Laws 
182(C) (communication, understanding and appreciation); N.Y. MENTAL 
HYGIENE LAW § 33.21(a)(5) (McKinney 1988) (understanding and apprecia-
tion); N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2980 (McKinney 1993) (same); W. VA. 
CODE § 16-30C-3(j) (1995) (communication). 
One statute requires the ability to make an "intelligent" decision. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-601(a) (Michie 1991) (also requires understand-
ing). Another allows administration of psychotropic medication against a 
patient's will if the individual "lacks the capacity to make a reasoned 
decision." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 405, para. 5/2-107.(d)(5) (1993); see also 
Estate of Austwick, 656 N.E.2d 779 (111. App. 1 Dist.) (finding that the 
trial court's determination that Mrs. Austwick could not distinguish right 
from wrong and lacked the capacity to make a responsible decision met 
the statutory test). 
55. MO. REV. STAT. § 404.805(1X2) (1995); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 
21-2011(11) (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3002(a) (1994); OKLA. STAT 
ANN. tit. 30, § 1-111(10), (19) (West 1996) and tit. 43A, § 10-103(5), (6) 
(West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 126.003 (4) (1994); Wis. STAT. § 50.06 (1) 
(1995). 
56. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201 (18) (1995). Interestingly, this s tatute 
could also be interpreted to encompass a "reasonable outcome" standard. 
For example, decisional choices tha t result in a person lacking food, shel-
ter, clothing or medical care could be seen as an indication that the 
person's decisionmaking ability is impaired and therefore imply he or she 
is incapacitated. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-1-7.5 (West 1994); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 311.621 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) ("make and communi-
cate a health care decision"); MlNN. STAT. § 145C.02 (West Supp. 1995) 
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leaving it to the courts to interpret the specific capacity re-
quirements. 
Clarification of commonly used elements and standards (or 
identifying a vocabulary) is the first step toward assessing 
policies and creating appropriate procedures for adjudications 
of competence. Clearly enunciating the components of legal 
standards, however, provides no firm basis for choosing among 
them on either normative or empirical grounds (assuming they 
identify different sets of presumably incompetent persons), or 
for setting required levels of ability that maintain the usual 
presumption that most people will be permitted to make their 
own decisions. In addition, evidence is lacking regarding how 
reliably standards can be applied to ensure that most people 
who are unable to make autonomous decisions are identified as 
incompetent, and that most competent persons are not identi-
fied as such.57 Moreover, without more information, it is im-
possible to comment on the relative value of different proce-
dures (judicial or non-judicial) for determining competence. 
The remainder of this Article describes the MacArthur Treat-
ment Competence Study's empirical investigation of medical 
decisionmaking competence and the implications of both the 
data and the four-part framework for some of these issues. 
II. THE MACARTHUR TREATMENT COMPETENCE STUDY 
The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study was designed 
to address clinical and policy questions regarding the abilities 
of persons with mental and medical illnesses to make decisions 
about treatment.58 Although the Study is described in greater 
("make or communicate health care decisions"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
159.019 (Michie 1993); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5403 (Supp. 1995) 
("make or communicate decisions"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
11.88.010(l)(a) (West Supp. 1995). 
57. The MacArthur data presented below do not address this issue. 
58. Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and 
Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995) [hereinafter 
MacArthur III]. The study sought to provide answers to three empirical 
questions. First, do persons with mental illness differ from non-mentally 
ill persons in their decisionmaking abilities, particularly as they relate to 
legal standards of competence? Second, if there are differences, are there 
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detail in other publications,69 a short summary of the instru-
ments, methods and results is offered to set the stage for the 
discussion in Par t III. 
A. Instruments60 
Instruments were developed to establish reliable and val-
id61 measures of decisionmaking abilities conceptually related 
to the four major legal components of competence to consent to 
t reatment identified in the previous section.62 Six criteria 
were used to guide the development of the measures: 
1. The functions being assessed needed to have close con-
ceptual relationships with the appropriate legal standards of 
competence.63 
reliable demographic or clinical characteristics that could be used to iden-
tify patients who are at greater risk of manifesting t reatment 
decisionmaking incapacities? Finally, what pat terns of deficits in abilities 
are related to various legal standards of competence? 
59. MacArthur I, supra note 19; Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur 
Treatment Competence Study II: Measures of Abilities Related to Compe-
tence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995) [here-
inafter MacArthur II]; MacArthur III, supra note 58; Thomas Grisso and 
Paul S. Appelbaum, A Comparison of Standards for Assessing Patients' 
Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 152 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1033 
(1995). 
60. This information is published in greater detail in MacArthur II, 
supra note 59. 
The initial research instruments were eventually modified to create 
the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool [hereinafter "Tool"] which 
can be used in routine clinical practice as a screening mechanism to 
identify those patients whose ability in one or more areas is impaired. 
61. Reliability refers to the instrument 's ability to generate reproduc-
ible data (i.e., to measure a variable consistently). Validity refers to 
whether the abilities that the instruments measure correspond with real-
world determinants of competence (i.e., they measure the abilities tha t 
are related to legal competence). 
62. This information is published in greater detail in MacArthur I, 
supra note 19. 
63. Standard psychological assessment tools have always suffered from 
an incongruency between the abilities they measure and the legal stan-
dards to which they are applied. See, e.g., Ruth Macklin, Philosophical 
Conceptions of Rationality and Psychiatric Notions of Competency 57 
SYNTHESE 205, 208-09 (1983); cf. ENQUIRY ON MENTAL COMPETENCY, 
FINAL REPORT 231 (David N. Weisstub, Chairman, Canadian Commission 
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2. The content of the instruments needed to be relevant to 
the decision being studied. Since the specific concern was 
whether or not to proceed with treatment, the instruments 
needed to reflect this goal.64 
3. The content of the instruments needed to be meaningful 
to the persons being studied.65 
1990) [hereinafter CANADIAN COMM'N ENQUIRY] (listing a number of ele-
ments of decisionmaking capacity which should be evaluated including 
the following: cognition/sensorium, memory and intellectual abilities, 
thought content, thought process and context-specific functional parame-
ters and relying on traditional psychological tests to examine these abili-
ties and aid in competence determinations). For example, IQ scores are 
limited indicators of one's competence to consent to treatment since IQ 
tests measure general intelligence, rather than the specific ability to 
make treatment decisions. The inferential step from general intelligence 
to ability to make treatment decisions increases the likelihood of an erro-
neous determination of patient capacity. Although a low score on an IQ 
test may correlate with a decreased ability to perform on any component 
of competence, it is not sufficient, in itself, for a determination of im-
paired capacity. 
64. There are a number of reasons for this. First, competence is gen-
erally recognized as being task-specific. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 
5, at 287. This is true even in the legal arena since competence to stand 
trial is different from competence to make a will, and is distinguished 
from competence to make treatment decisions. GRISSO, supra note 17, at 
7. Global determinations of competence are becoming less popular as 
evidenced by the trend towards limited guardianships (i.e., awarding 
guardians the decisionmaking authority in only specific areas, such as 
financial or major medical treatments, rather than awarding guardians 
the power to control multiple aspects of a person's life where such inter-
vention is unnecessary). Even those states which still allow for broad 
guardianship powers generally recognize that the appointment of a guard-
ian does not establish that the ward is incompetent to make all deci-
sions. See generally SAMUEL BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED 
AND THE LAW 375 (1985) (stating that the modern trend is to limit 
decisionmaking rights only to the extent necessary to cure the particular 
problem). Second, measures of performance in different domains lack rele-
vance to the treatment decisionmaking context and may involve different 
levels of complexity. Thus courts are less likely to view such measures as 
accurate indicators of treatment decisionmaking competence. 
65. Performance may be positively affected by the patient's greater 
motivation to reach a good decision on an important issue. Conversely, 
performance may be negatively affected by the anxiety which accompanies 
difficult treatment decisions. Since the net effect of these factors is un-
clear, the content of the instruments had to focus, as much as possible, 
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4. The content of the instruments needed to be sufficiently 
standardized so that comparisons within and across subject 
groups were possible.66 
5. Measurements had to have objective criteria for scoring 
that could be applied in a reliable fashion.67 
6. The instruments had to be practical for use in a re-
search setting and potentially adaptable for clinical use. Most 
importantly, the instruments had to be able to be adminis-
tered in one sitting and by interviewers without extensive 
clinical training. 
The instruments developed for the MacArthur study reflect 
the four legally relevant abilities described in Par t I and the 
principles identified above. First, ability to communicate a 
choice was operationalized as a patient's selection of a treat-
ment option in a decisionmaking task. A patient who selected 
an option received full credit, one who expressed ambivalence 
received less credit, while a patient who did not choose an op-
tion received no credit. 
Second, the information required as part of the understand-
ing component was drawn from the requirements of informed 
consent.68 After simultaneous oral and written disclosure 
on information relevant to the individual patient. Thus, persons with dif-
ferent disorders required different versions of the instruments. 
Two questions embedded in each of the four components are: (i) 
whether the patient has the ability to do something and (ii) whether the 
patient actually evidences that ability in a specific decisionmaking con-
text. For example, a patient who has the ability to communicate may not 
do so in a particular case. Likewise, a patient who has the ability to 
comprehend information may not actually comprehend the pertinent infor-
mation. The MacArthur instruments are tailored to the specific diagnosis 
and can concurrently test a patient's capacity to understand and evaluate 
the patient's actual understanding. 
66. Although some variation of the instruments was necessary to ac-
commodate the third requirement, the differences could not be so great 
tha t they did not allow valid comparisons. As a result, the content of the 
instruments reflected information generally relevant to a diagnostic group 
but allowed parallel versions to be generated for other diagnostic groups. 
67. The development of reliable methods for assessing competence-
related functions would allow further research on these issues to proceed 
with greater ease. Moreover, such consistency will likely be looked upon 
favorably by the courts who will want assurances that scores on the 
instruments are easily interpretable and replicable. 
68. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4. 
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(worded at an 8th grade level) incorporating each element, the 
patient was tested on his or her comprehension of the follow-
ing: (a) the nature of the disorder, (b) the nature of the recom-
mended treatment, (c) the probable benefits of the treatment, 
(d) the probable risks and discomforts of the treatment, and (e) 
an alternative treatment and its related benefits and risks.69 
The disclosure focused on the patient's diagnosed medical or 
mental illness. The patient was asked to demonstrate his com-
prehension of such information by paraphrasing it, then by 
recognizing the items of information after their presenta-
tion.70 
Appreciation71 was more difficult to evaluate since patients 
could rationally disagree with their diagnosis or prognosis. 
Only disagreements based on rigidly-held beliefs involving 
distortions or denial as symptoms of psychopathology most 
strongly suggested incompetence.72 Therefore, the apprecia-
tion component was operationalized as the patient's acknowl-
edgment of his or her illness and the potential value of treat-
ment or acknowledgment of these things after illogical premis-
es underlying the initial non-acknowledgment were challenged. 
Because the acknowledgment factor focused on the patient's 
perception of the value of treatment, whether the patient 
would actually accept treatment was irrelevant. Patients73 
were asked six questions aimed at assessing their acknowledg-
ment of the following: (1) their symptoms (confirmed by the 
69. MacArthur II, supra note 59, at 128. 
70. Understanding was assessed in three ways: (i) subjects were given 
an uninterrupted disclosure and asked to paraphrase it, (ii) subjects were 
given each element of the disclosure separately and asked to paraphrase 
it, and then (iii) subjects were asked to recognize statements (i.e., identi-
fy them as the "same as" or "different from" the messages in the disclo-
sure) before moving on to the next element disclosure. 
71. Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren Roth, Competency to Consent to Re-
search, 39 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 951 (1982) (first identifying an 
appreciation criterion). 
72. See NEJM, supra note 19 (stating that a patient's deficiency in 
appreciating the situation and its consequences is usually caused by 
pathologic distortion or denial due to the patient's perception, impair-
ment, treatment or the treating agency's motivation). 
73. The appreciation instrument was not administered to community 
control ("comparison") groups since they were not ill and therefore could 
not be tested on this measure. 
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hospital chart), (2) their beliefs about the severity of their 
symptoms (confirmed by the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale 
("BPRS")),74 (3) their diagnosis (confirmed by the hospital 
chart), (4) the benefits of treatment for their condition, (5) the 
potential benefit of a specific, proposed treatment, and (6) the 
likelihood, if any, of improvement without treatment.75 Pa-
tients who initially did not acknowledge any benefits to be 
derived from treatment were asked to explain their reasons, 
and were presented with a hypothetical nullifying those rea-
sons. For example, a patient who denied the potential benefit 
of a specific treatment (such as antipsychotic medication) be-
cause he thought that he was too ill to benefit from treatment 
would have the inquiry re-framed in such a way as to negate 
his objections ("Imagine that a doctor tells you a medication 
exists that has been proven to help 90% of the people with 
problems as serious as yours. Do you think this medication 
might be of more benefit to you than getting no treatment at 
all?"). Only those patients who continued to disavow the poten-
tial value of the treatment in the face of a hypothetical which 
nullified their original premise received no credit. 
Rational manipulation refers to the reasoning processes 
employed in decisionmaking rather than the rationality or 
reasonableness of the actual choice. The accuracy of the pre-
mises relied upon is irrelevant. A patient who scored poorly on 
appreciation because of inaccurate beliefs about treatment 
(e.g., the treatment would cause the person to shrink in size), 
could still score well on rational manipulation if the patient 
manifested a logical process of decisionmaking. Thus, a patient 
who erroneously believes that treatment would cause him to 
shrink demonstrates logical decisionmaking when he refuses 
treatment because he does not want to become microscopically 
small. This rationality component was defined operationally as 
the degree to which patients demonstrated an ability to do the 
following: (1) seek information, (2) consider the consequences of 
74. The BPRS provides a method for rat ing the presence and severity 
of psychiatric symptoms/signs manifested by a psychiatric patient, based 
on a clinical interview in which inquiry and observation provide data for 
the ratings. The version of the BPRS used in this study contained 19 
items. MacArthur III, supra note 58. 
75. MacArthur II, supra note 59, at 132. 
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treatment alternatives, (3) compare two treatment alterna-
tives, (4) consider numerous treatment alternatives at one 
time, (5) consider potential risks or discomforts from treat-
ment, (6) apply personal preferences consistently, (7) make 
logical inferences about ordinal relationships (i.e., to infer that 
A is the largest when given, A>B and B>C), and (8) distinguish 
correctly the relative values of numerical probabilities.76 Pa-
tients were provided with a hypothetical in which they were 
asked to choose a treatment. They were then questioned about 
their treatment choice and evaluated on the eight variables 
identified above. 
The MacArthur competence assessment instruments and the 
subsequently developed Tool77 do not function as replace-
ments for the informed consent process and are not meant to 
serve as substitutes for clinically based competence determina-
tions; rather they are designed to identify possible impair-
ments in decisionmaking ability that are relevant to the as-
sessment of patients' competence. 
B. Sampling Procedures 
Once the instruments were designed and pre-tested, they 
were administered to various diagnostic groups. It should be 
noted at the outset that mental illness is not a homogeneous 
category; many different types of disorders can be thought of 
as mental illnesses and cognitive functioning can vary across 
and within diagnostic categories.78 Thus, while discrete diag-
nostic groupings may afford grounds for making inferences, 
one should keep in mind that competence determinations must 
always be made on an individual basis. Two mental illnesses 
were chosen for the study: schizophrenia and major depression. 
Schizophrenia affects patients' thought processes and their 
contact with reality.79 Numerous approaches to treatment ex-
76. MacArthur II, supra note 59, at 135-36. 
77. See infra note 148. 
78. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TASK FORCE REPORT 32, THE USE 
OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSES IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 7-8 (1992). 
79. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 273-
289 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV] ("Schizophrenia is a disturbance 
that lasts for at least 6 months and includes at least 1 month of active-
phase symptoms (i.e., two [or more] of the following: delusions, hallucina-
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ist, most of which focus on antipsychotic medications.80 
Schizophrenia is considered the most severe mental illness and 
it affects cognitive functioning adversely.81 Major depres-
sion,82 on the other hand, is the most common major mental 
illness, and while it usually does not entail as much thought 
disturbance as schizophrenia, severe depression may also raise 
questions of competence. The majority of research on compe-
tence focuses on these two disorders, allowing comparison of 
the MacArthur83 results with previous studies. 
The MacArthur study investigated decisionmaking capacities 
of patients soon after their admission to an inpatient facility, 
since evaluating subjects during this period maximizes the 
possibility of studying a range of impairments, including the 
most severe ones. In addition, decisionmaking by psychiatric 
inpatients includes the right to refuse treatment, and the deci-
sions are frequently made in the first few days of hospitaliza-
tion.84 Mental illness is not equivalent to incompetence; many 
people who suffer from mental illness, even the most severe 
forms, are competent to make treatment decisions. Moreover, 
involuntary commitment to a hospital does not automatically 
result in a legal determination of one's incompetence, nor is 
voluntary commitment a waiver of decisionmaking rights.85 
Hence, persons with mental illness may be called upon to 
tions, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, 
negative symptoms)." Id. at 273). 
80. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 1759 (17th ed. 1993). 
81. James M. Gold & Philip D. Harvey, Cognitive Deficits in Schizo-
phrenia, 16 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OP N. A M . 295 (1993). 
82. DSM IV, supra note 79, at 320 ("The essential feature of a Major 
Depressive Episode is a period of at least 2 weeks during which there is 
either depressed mood or the loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all 
activities . . . . The individual must also experience at least four addi-
tional symptoms drawn from a list that includes changes in appetite or 
weight, sleep and psychomotor activity; decreased energy; feelings of 
worthlessness or guilt; difficulty thinking, concentrating or making deci-
sions; or recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation, plans or at-
tempts."). 
83. This research literature is reviewed in MacArthur I, supra note 
19. 
84. PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW 
AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE (1994). 
85. See generally BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 64, at 375. 
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make treatment-related decisions at multiple points during 
their illness. 
Along with the two groups of mentally ill patients, a third 
group—medically ill patients86—was included. Comparisons 
between the performance of mentally ill and medically ill pa-
tients enable researchers to draw inferences about the impact 
of mental illness per se (as opposed to the undifferentiated 
effects of hospitalization) on decisionmaking abilities. Patients 
with ischemic heart disease (angina pectoris)87 were chosen 
for the study since they matched the other two populations in 
their high incidence of hospitalization, considerable chronicity, 
frequent treatment using medications, and accessibility during 
hospitalization for interview.88 Since one of our objectives was 
to isolate the impact of mental illness, of greatest importance 
was the fact that both the illness and treatment do not typical-
ly cause significant cognitive impairments. 
The three groups were compared with subjects who were not 
86. Many mental illnesses are thought to be biologically based. In this 
sense they may be no different from "medical" illnesses. The term is used 
here to highlight the distinction between mental illnesses, which are 
thought to result primarily in cognitive, perceptual, mood and behavioral 
impairments, and illnesses which primarily result in impairments of 
physical functioning. 
Overall, the degree of impairment of decisionmaking capacity result-
ing from medical illnesses is probably underestimated. See, e.g., Lewis M. 
Cohen et al., Do Clinical and Formal Assessments of the Capacity of Pa-
tients in the Intensive Care Unit to Make Decisions Agree? 153 ARCH. 
INTERN. MED. 2481 (1993) (finding 60% of patients have impaired scores 
on a global measure of cognitive functioning, but only one-third of pa-
tients are judged by medical staff as incapable of giving informed con-
sent); L. Jaime Fitten & Martha S. Waite, Impact of Medical Hospitaliza-
tion on Treatment Decision-Making Capacity of the Elderly, 150 ARCH. 
INTERN. MED. 1717, 1720 (1990) (finding that elderly inpatients scored 
significantly worse than control subjects on tests of understanding and 
reasoning, with physicians markedly underestimating the degree of im-
pairment of the patient group). As a result, the relative effect of mental 
illness is overestimated. By comparing both subject populations and their 
community comparisons, the MacArthur study controls for the baseline 
effect of illness per se on capacity. 
87. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 104 (17th ed. 1993). 
88. Symptoms of angina include steady severe pain and feeling of 
pressure in a region of the heart, sweating, difficulty with breathing, and 
variable pulse rate (usually tense and quick). Id. 
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ill. Because a random sample of the community is unlikely to 
match all three subject populations on factors which may affect 
performance on cognitive tasks, comparison subjects were re-
cruited and matched to each diagnostic group in terms of age, 
gender, race, education and highest level of occupation. Stan-
dard diagnostic interviews were employed to screen out those 
who met the criteria for either schizophrenia or depression. 
The study was conducted at three sites: Worcester, Massa-
chusetts; Kansas City, Missouri; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
Ten research assistants who were trained to administer and 
score the instruments89 collected data from the subjects: 75 
schizophrenia patients, 92 depressed patients, 82 angina pa-
tients, and 249 community subjects. 
89. The instruments were standardized; that is, questions were asked 
of the subjects in exactly the same way and the scoring was objective, 
based on specific scoring rules ra ther than subjective judgments about 
the quality of the subjects' responses. 
Although it is ordinarily desirable to have raters blind as to which 
group a subject belongs, this was obviously impractical here. Therefore, 
expectancy effects cannot be ruled out entirely. However, they are re-
duced by the fact that researchers at each site had primary responsibility 
for only one diagnostic group. 
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C. Results90 
There were three main findings of the MacArthur study. 
First, patients hospitalized with schizophrenia or depression 
more often showed deficits in their decisionmaking than hospi-
talized medically ill patients and non-patient comparison 
groups.91 Most of this performance differential, however, was 
attributable to patients with schizophrenia. Low performance 
on the MacArthur measures can be mapped on a continuum 
ranging from slight to substantial deficits. For this study, the 
90. This information is published in greater detail in MacArthur III, 
supra note 58. It is important to note that the data that follow probably 
underestimate the prevalence of impairments among the various 
populations. First, because of the delay between the hospital admission 
and study participation, many of the subjects had already begun 
treatment for their illness. Second, in some cases, both mentally ill and 
medically ill patients who suffer from serious impairments were excluded 
from the study for a number of reasons—sometimes doctors did not allow 
the researchers to approach potential subjects in order to protect the 
patients from intrusions or to protect the researchers from potentially 
violent patients. In addition, the most severely impaired subjects would 
likely have been unable to provide informed consent for participation in 
the study or to participate in extended interviews. All of the excluded 
groups probably would have manifested poorer performance on the 
measures of decisional abilities than the subjects who were recruited. 
91. The MacArthur study found that patients with mental illness more 
often manifested deficits in performance on the measures of understand-
ing, appreciation and reasoning than did medically ill patients and their 
non-ill comparison groups (only 5% of respondents overall were unable to 
express a choice, usually because of extreme ambivalence, and there was 
no significant difference between hospitalized patients and their compari-
son groups). 
Percent of Subjects Scoring in the "Impaired" Range 
on the Three Measures 
Measures Schizophrenia Depression Angina Comparison 
Understanding 28.0 5.4 7.3 2.4 
Appreciation 22.6 11.9 4.8 NA* 
Reasoning 24.0 7.6 0.0 2.0 
* See supra note 73. 
MacArthur III, supra note 58. 
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extent a performance was deemed inadequate or "impaired" 
was determined by the relative infrequency of scores below a 
certain point. Thus, "impaired" subjects in the Mac Arthur 
Study were those who scored in the bottom 5% of the distribu-
tion of scores for the total study sample.92 Here, "impairment" 
is an arbitrary measure—although it takes into account the 
distribution of capacities in the general study population 
(which is not necessarily representative of the non-study popu-
lation), it is highly dependent upon the choice of statistical cut-
off points. Thus, the percentages of subjects identified as "im-
paired" would increase if the cut-off were raised above 5% (e.g., 
"adequate" performance is defined as encompassing the range 
of scores within only one standard deviation from the mean), 
or decrease if the cut-off were lowered below 5% (e.g., "ade-
quate" performance is defined as encompassing the range of 
scores within three standard deviations from the mean). 
Second, although patients with schizophrenia showed the 
greatest impairments, the majority of these patients performed 
in the "unimpaired" range on each measure—72% on under-
standing, 77.4% on appreciation, and 76% on reasoning. Thus 
the lower overall performance on each individual measure was 
due to a minority of patients within the schizophrenia group. 
Moreover, examination of the correlations between low scores 
on each of the measures showed that the instruments identi-
fied different subgroups of "impaired" subjects. Although ap-
proximately the same percentage of subjects scored in the 
"impaired" range on each measure (one-quarter of the patients 
with schizophrenia), the identity of the impaired group 
changed. A substantial number of participants who demon-
strated "adequate" performance on one measure manifested 
92. This is a basic statistical means of identifying the lower end of a 
range of scores—"adequate" scores include any score falling within two 
standard deviations of the mean, and "impaired" scores fall below this 
range. Courts and legislatures may find this number (5%) to be too high 
for use in competence determinations and may prefer to set the statis-
tical cut-off point so that a larger majority (i.e., greater than 95%) of the 
population is presumed competent. It should be stressed here that there 
are problems in using statistical cut-off points to set competence criteria, 
and if one were inclined to use statistical data in this way, it would 
need to be based upon epidemiologically valid samples, not the matched 
samples utilized here. 
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"impaired" performance on another. For example, of the 72% of 
subjects with schizophrenia who performed adequately on the 
understanding measure, 24.1% had impaired performance on 
appreciation and 14.8% on reasoning.93 
Third, although age, gender, race, education and highest 
occupation failed to provide a basis for accurately predicting 
impairments among the groups, patients who manifested 
greater severity of psychiatric symptoms, especially thought 
disturbances, also tended to manifest deficits in understanding 
and reasoning. This finding was consistent with previous liter-
ature and research on cognitive deficits associated with schizo-
phrenia.94 The following Part of this Article addresses the im-
plications of these data for legal determinations of competence. 
93. 
Percent of Subjects with Adequate Performance on 
One Measure who Show Impairment on Another 
Impaired Performance on 
















MacArthur III, supra note 58. 
94. See, e.g., Barry D. Rosenfield et al., Decision Making in a 
Schizophrenic Population, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 651 (1992); Paul R. 
Benson et al., Information Disclosure, Subject Understanding, and In-
formed Consent in Psychiatric Research, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 455, 
455 (1988) (stating tha t people with schizophrenia demonstrated poor 
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III. APPLYING THE MACARTHUR TREATMENT COMPETENCE 
S T U D Y T O Q U E S T I O N S R E G A R D I N G P O L I C I E S F O R 
DETERMINING COMPETENCE 
The framework described in Par t I and the data obtained 
from the MacArthur study can be applied to two sets of policy-
related issues. First, they assist in formulating standards of 
legal competence. There are three initial policy questions tha t 
must be addressed in undertaking this task: (1) which compo-
nents of capacity should be included in a standard of legal 
competence, (2) what degree of incapacity or deficiency on one 
or more of the components should result in a determination of 
legal incompetence, (3) and what specific information must the 
patient understand, appreciate or rationally manipulate? There 
are also a number of procedural issues tha t can be explored 
using the MacArthur data, including the following: the value of 
competence screening for specific patient populations, proce-
dural mechanisms for determining competence, and the weight 
courts should give to data such as the MacArthur findings. The 
remaining Part of the Article discusses how the MacArthur 
data may help answer these questions. The subsequent initial 
reflections on how the MacArthur data can help to construct 
standards of legal competence should not be taken to imply 
tha t an empirical analysis alone will suffice. On the contrary, 
we recognize tha t the answers to these questions are influ-
enced as well by normative criteria. Although we provide a 
sketch of the normative issues, a full account is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
A. Formulating the Standard 
Every jurisdiction faces the challenge of formulating a gov-
erning standard for decisionmaking competence. Existing stan-
dards, as noted above, whether developed through case law or 
statutes, often contain vague and confusing criteria.95 Case 
law standards, in particular, are highly sensitive to the fact 
situation of the case on which they are based, leaving residual 
uncertainty as to whether other standards might be applied by 
the same court in other circumstances. To improve the stan-
95. See supra Par t I. 
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dards used to govern competence determinations, a number of 
scholars and committees have attempted to develop model 
standards delineating specific requirements of capacity.96 
The framework of standards for competence elaborated by 
the MacArthur research group should help to order and clarify 
the present confusion about standards by delineating the range 
96. For example, the Uniform Probate Code defines an "incapacitated 
person" as "any person who is impaired . . . to the extent of lacking 
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible 
decisions." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-103(7) (1994). (Under our framework 
this would likely translate into understanding, communication and appre-
ciation.) See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 892A cmt. b (1977) 
(stating that to constitute effective consent, the individual must be "capa-
ble of appreciating the nature, extent and probable consequences of the 
conduct consented to . . . . "). The President's Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
identifies three elements of patients' capacity to make health care deci-
sions: "(1) possession of a set of values and goals, (2) the ability to com-
municate and to understand information, and (3) the ability to reason 
and to deliberate about one's choices." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE 
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAV-
IORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIO-
NER RELATIONSHIP 57 (1982) (internal citation omitted) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]. A Canadian report on mental competence proposed 
that "in order to be considered mentally capable to make a treatment 
decision, an individual must have the ability to (a) understand the na-
ture of the condition for which the treatment is proposed, (b) to under-
stand the nature of the proposed treatment, and (c) to appreciate the 
consequences of giving or withholding consent." CANADIAN COMM'N ENQUI-
RY, supra note 63, at 250. (Under our framework this would likely trans-
late into understanding and appreciation.) Finally, Allen Buchanan and 
Dan Brock argue that "[t]he chief elements of patient competence are: (a) 
the ability to understand the relevant options, (b) the ability to under-
stand the relevant consequences for the patient's life of each of the rele-
vant options, [and] (c) the ability to evaluate the consequences of the 
various options by relating them to his or her own values." BUCHANAN & 
BROCK, supra note 7, at 83. (Under our framework this would likely 
translate into understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation.) 
Although all of the above formulations of competence may be intuitively 
acceptable, all omit one or more of the commonly used legal criteria. 
Moreover, the drafters of these and other models do not always indicate 
their awareness of the existence of other potential standards, and often 
fail to justify the choices they made to include one component in a stan-
dard and exclude others. 
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of standards endorsed by the courts and legislatures. Formula-
tors of standards should now have a common starting point 
and a common vocabulary by which to compare the approaches 
in various jurisdictions. Other standards than those identified 
here may evolve, of course, but the burden should be on per-
sons who deviate from the general common law and statutory 
structure to justify their reasons for doing so. 
Formulating a standard will begin with the identification of 
the governing normative principles. On a normative level, the 
choice between standards involves balancing the extent to 
which a failure to demonstrate the ability measured by a com-
ponent indicates impaired autonomy in decisionmaking against 
whether such a failure is a sufEcient basis for limiting a 
patient's decisionmaking authority. Although seriously im-
paired people should be protected, the right to make decisions 
for oneself should not be burdened more than is absolutely 
necessary. In consequentialist terms the issue is whether the 
harm of incorrectly labeling autonomous agents as incompetent 
is outweighed by the harm of incorrectly labeling 
nonautonomous agents as competent. The former is a harm to 
the patient's autonomy, or right of self-determination. The 
latter is only significant to the extent that the patient's well-
being is at risk; no harm results from allowing an incompetent 
patient to make a decision of minimal effect or one that is in 
keeping with his or her objective best interests. Only compe-
tent patients, however, are free to make decisions that are not 
in their best interests.97 
Once the governing normative principles have been identi-
fied and, in many cases, balanced against each other, effecting 
97. See generally BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 7, at 40-41. The 
doctrine of "substituted judgment" complicates this somewhat. When sub-
stituted judgment is used, a proxy decisionmaker must decide what an 
incompetent individual would have wanted if he or she had been compe-
tent. Id. at 10. The final choice does not have to be in the patient 's 
objective best interest. As a result, although an incompetent patient 
should not be allowed to make a decision tha t is not in her objective 
best interest, a decision can be made for an incompetent patient that is 
not in her objective best interest. This distinction is important as the 
substituted judgment standard does not allow incompetent decisionmak-
ing, but rather, effectuates the previous (competent) wishes of a presently 
incompetent patient. 
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the desired result will depend on crafting a standard that 
results in people being correctly identified as competent or 
incompetent. Three aspects of formulating a standard need to 
be taken into account here. First, the choice of components of 
the final standard is important, as different standards may 
result in different people and different numbers of people being 
identified as impaired. Second, the required level of perfor-
mance, in a quantitative sense, must be specified. For example, 
in addition to applying an "understanding standard," one must 
also establish how much understanding is necessary: is it suffi-
cient that a patient manifests understanding of only 50% of 
the information that is disclosed, or must a patient understand 
95% of what he or she is told? Third, necessary qualitative 
aspects of performance must be identified. For example, a 
patient may understand that coronary bypass surgery is aimed 
at relieving the pain in her chest but fail to grasp that it will 
do so (if successful) by creating a shunt to permit blood to 
travel past an arterial obstruction. Is understanding of both 
pieces of information necessary? The following sections will 
address each of these three factors in turn. 
1. Choice of Components of a Standard 
Selecting the components of a standard, as noted above, 
involves a combination of normative and empirical consider-
ations. The first issue that must be addressed in this process is 
whether a single standard will serve for all medical 
decisionmaking, or whether discretion will be allowed in choos-
ing components. Obvious advantages of a single standard in-
clude greater ease and consistency of application, with fewer 
opportunities to manipulate the outcome by changing the way 
in which a situation is characterized (e.g., construing a case as 
involving a "high-risk" decision, thus altering the relevant 
standard). 
Although these factors weigh strongly in favor of a uniform 
standard for all competence determinations, there may be 
circumstances in which important policy goals can be achieved 
by varying which of the four components of decisionmaking 
competence are applied.98 These "exceptions" to the single 
98. See, e.g., James F. Drane, The Many Faces of Competency, 15 
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standard should be clearly delineated ahead of t ime and pro-
fessional discretion should be minimized. 
The American Psychiatric Association Task Force on Con-
sent to Voluntary Hospitalization sets out such an exception by 
suggesting the application of an "understanding standard" to 
assess the capacity of persons who desire to admit themselves 
to a psychiatric facility—regardless of the standard that might 
be applied to other t reatment decisions." Under the Task 
Force's approach, the patient would be required to demonstrate 
tha t he knew he was entering a hospital for t reatment and 
tha t release may not be automatic.100 He would not, however, 
need to demonstrate an appreciation of the t reatment (e.g., a 
patient who thought that t reatment would be effective because 
of interference from ultra-violet light waves emanating from 
overhead fixtures may still be considered competent to admit 
himself). This minimal standard of competence may be war-
ranted, the APA Task Force argued, because of the low risk of 
harm from voluntary hospitalization, particularly when the 
patient's choice is confirmed by an independent professional 
judgment, as well as society's interest in encouraging individu-
al choice in this context.101 Voluntary admission is linked 
both with better t reatment outcome and less stigma.102 The 
alternative, involuntary commitment, will likely result in a 
greater (longer-term) deprivation of liberty. In this case, the 
Task Force concluded, the harm to the individual (i.e., a minor 
deprivation of liberty) should be balanced against the possible 
harm of not allowing people who need treatment to get 
help.103 To the degree that we want to encourage individual 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 18 (1985) (arguing for a sliding scale of stan-
dards which increase in rigor as the consequences flowing from patient 
decisions become more serious). 
99. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TASK FORCE REPORT 34, CONSENT 
TO VOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION 8-9 (1993) [hereinafter APA REPORT]. 
100. Id. at 9. Most states use a "conditional" voluntary admission mod-
el which allows for the temporary retention of a voluntary patient for a 
period of up to five days after discharge is requested, even over tha t 
patient's objection. This is generally used to permit the initiation of invol-
untary proceedings where necessary. Id. at 4; see also BRAKEL ET AL., 
supra note 64. 
101. APA REPORT, supra note 99, at 7. 
102. Id. at 1. 
103. The balance of harms depends on whether the people who would 
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choice in this context, even at the risk of possibly allowing an 
incompetent and therefore non-autonomous person to make a 
decision, a limited standard of competence may be appropriate. 
Whether or not exceptions to the general standard of compe-
tence are recognized in a jurisdiction, determining which com-
ponents to include in that standard requires careful attention. 
All jurisdictions appear to include in their standards of compe-
tence a requirement that patients be able to evidence a choice 
and a minimal understanding requirement.104 This is based 
on the normative judgments that a person who cannot evidence 
a decision, or who fails to comprehend the information relevant 
to a treatment decision, is not able to make even a minimally 
adequate choice. We believe these judgments are sound. 
Ought a jurisdiction stop with an "understanding standard" 
or should consideration be given to the addition of appreciation 
or rational manipulation components? The MacArthur data are 
helpful here. If addition of the appreciation and rational ma-
nipulation criteria identify persons as impaired who would not 
have been detected using an understanding standard alone, 
there is a practical gain from incorporating them into a final 
standard.105 In fact, the data suggest that the four compo-
nents do identify different people as impaired. Application of 
any one of the three major criteria (understanding, apprecia-
tion and reasoning) to the sample of patients with schizophre-
nia revealed impairment in approximately 25% of the group. 
not be permitted to sign in voluntarily meet the involuntary commitment 
criteria (i.e., there is an alternative means to enter the hospital). If these 
individuals met the involuntary standard, then the harm resulting from 
the deprivation of liberty that ensues from voluntary hospitalization 
should be balanced against the possible deprivation of liberty that results 
from involuntary hospitalization. If, on the other hand, voluntary patients 
do not meet the involuntary criteria, and both voluntary and involuntary 
hospitalization are thereby ruled out, then the balance of harms must 
also take into consideration the detrimental effects of not getting needed 
(and requested) help. 
104. See supra notes 23*57 and accompanying text. 
105. There might be other goals achieved by including appreciation or 
rational manipulation, even if no additional incompetent individuals were 
identified. Such an approach might serve to educate the public about the 
dimensions of capacity normatively required before a decisionmaking 
process is considered adequate. 
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But use of all three elements conjointly resulted in more than 
half of the patients with schizophrenia being classified as im-
paired.106 There are empirical grounds, therefore, for adding 
appreciation and/or reasoning components to a compound stan-
dard, as many jurisdictions presently do.107 
106. We would reemphasize here that data reported below apply to 
patients recently admitted to an inpatient facility and therefore represent 
a more severely ill sample of people suffering from schizophrenia or de-
pression then would be observed in the general population. But see supra 
note 90 (noting that the data probably underestimate impairment in 
hospitalized groups). 
Percent of Subjects Scoring in the Impaired Range 
on Compound Standards 
Standards Schizophrenia Depression Angina Compar-
ison 
Understanding &/or 45.3 18.4 12.2 2.4 
Appreciation 
Understanding &/or 38.7 11.9 7.3 4.0 
Reasoning 
Understanding, Appre- 52.0 23.8 12.2 4.0* 
ciation &/or Reasoning 
*These percentages do not reflect performance on Appreciation, which was not admin-
istered to comparison subjects. 
Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 59, at 1036. 
107. The case law and commentaries tend to establish a hierarchical 
model of competence, see, e.g., Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 71, as 
though the four elements of capacity tha t might form the components of 
a legal standard represent a linear progression of increasingly difficult 
measures. On a priori grounds, it is difficult to quarrel with the conclu-
sion that evidencing a choice is a threshold requirement and understand-
ing is a logical predicate to appreciation and rational manipulation. The 
results of the MacArthur Study, however, suggest that a strictly hierar-
chical model is flawed from an empirical perspective. Although evidencing 
a choice does appear to have a threshold function, understanding, appre-
ciation and rational manipulation do not seem to represent increasingly 
rigorous criteria. Instead, each entails approximately the same amount of 
rigor, but identifies different, albeit partially overlapping, populations 
with impaired capacities. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
David Weisstub, Chairman of the Canadian Enquiry on Mental 
Competency, argues tha t a rational manipulation criterion is inappropri-
ate because it is indistinguishable from appreciation. See CANADIAN 
COMM'N ENQUIRY, supra note 63, at 188. Analysis of the MacArthur data 
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Appreciation has been incorporated into a compound stan-
dard of competence in many jurisdictions. The likely rationale 
for inclusion is that people who fail to acknowledge that they 
are ill or that effective treatment may be available (the most 
common impairments of appreciation) cannot make meaningful 
choices about treatment. People who do not know they are sick 
cannot weigh adequately the risks and benefits of potential 
treatments. Thus in Lane v. Candura108 the patient was con-
sidered competent to refuse amputation of a gangrenous leg 
since she "appreciated] the nature and consequences of her 
act" (i.e., that she would likely die without surgery).109 Con-
versely, in In re Roe,110 the patient was held to be incompe-
tent to make an informed decision about antipsychotic medica-
tion because although he "understood] the risks attendant on 
taking [the medication], . . . he clearly d[id] not appreciate the 
risks associated with refusing it" (i.e., he did not believe he 
was mentally ill).111 The MacArthur data suggest that a sig-
nificant number of additional patients—24% of patients with 
schizophrenia, 13.8% of patients suffering from depression, and 
5.3% of patients with angina in the study population—would 
be identified as impaired when an appreciation component is 
combined with an "understanding standard."112 Taken togeth-
er, the normative and empirical rationales constitute strong 
justification for inclusion of appreciation in a compound compe-
tence standard. 
shows that rational manipulation is distinguishable from the other mea-
sures of capacity. See MacArthur I, supra note 19, at 116-18. 
108. 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). 
109. Id. at 1236. 
110. 583 N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. 1992). 
111. Id. at 1286. 
It may be significant to note that in Roe the court appointed a 
guardian to make a decision based upon what the patient would have 
wanted had he been competent. Id. Thus any potential harm to patients' 
autonomy may be lessened by the use of a substituted judgment standard 
which seeks to maximize patients' right of self-determination by effectuat-
ing their competent preferences. But see Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. 
Appelbaum, Substituted Judgment: Best Interests in Disguise, 13 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 8, 9 (1983) (criticizing this aspect of the substi-
tuted judgment approach). 
112. See supra note 93. 
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Whether a rational manipulation component is desirable as 
well is a closer question. Analysis of the MacArthur data 
shows a smaller percentage of people who understand and 
appreciate adequately but score in the impaired range on rea-
soning.113 Jurisdictions that already omit this component may 
do so because of the perceived likelihood of abuse. For exam-
ple, there is the possibility that a clinician or a court will con-
fuse the requirement of a "reasoned choice" with requirement 
of a "reasonable choice," thus inappropriately shifting the in-
quiry from the decisionmaking process to the outcome.114 
Abuse is possible, however, under any of the proposed stan-
dards, and there is no evidence that the rational manipulation 
component is especially susceptible. 
If, however, concerns over misuse of a rational manipulation 
component are thought to outweigh the desirability of identify-
ing persons with impaired reasoning, one alternative would be 
to hold the criterion in reserve for exceptional cases.115 Thus, 
a jurisdiction might identify specific situations in which the 
criterion should apply, such as cases in which the patient must 
choose between a number of complex alternatives, and thus the 
possibility of error in application is outweighed by the harm of 
letting potentially incompetent patients make complex treat-
ment decisions. As the number of treatment options increases, 
assuming only one option best satisfies one's interests, the 
probability of choosing an option that is not in one's best inter-
est is greater (e.g., if only 2 choices exist, there is a 50% proba-
113. 6.7% of schizophrenia patients, 5.4% of depressed patients, and 0% 
of angina patients. See supra note 93. Note, however, tha t even these 
small percentages may account for a large number of actual patients 
since hundreds of thousands of persons with each of these disorders are 
hospitalized each year. 
114. See supra note 22. 
115. Permitting discretion in whether to apply the rational manipula-
tion criterion may lead to a number of negative consequences including 
less consistency in competence determinations and greater opportunity to 
manipulate the outcome of a competence assessment by changing the 
required abilities (e.g., adding a rational manipulation component) when a 
patient refuses treatment. This may be mitigated, to a large degree, by 
clearly specifying the situations in which a rational manipulation criteri-
on should be applied. The less discretion allowed, the less possibility the 
standard will be abused, or applied inconsistently. 
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bility of selecting the against-interest choice; three choices, 
66%; four choices, 75%).116 Moreover, as the complexity of 
each option increases, a patient whose ability to process infor-
mation logically is impaired may be more likely to fail to make 
an autonomous decision (i.e., a decision in accordance with his 
or her preferences). When the number and complexity of treat-
ment options are high or the degree of risk involved is high, 
there is a stronger argument for including a rational manipu-
lation component in the legal standard of competence. 
2. Quantitative Aspects: Degree of Capacity Required 
In addition to which components are chosen, the degree of 
deficits in ability required to establish incompetence depends 
on how "impaired" performance is defined.117 Raising the de-
gree of ability required for competence will result in fewer 
subjects considered competent, while lowering the degree of 
requisite ability may have the effect of allowing people who 
show significant impairments to make binding decisions. In 
setting competence criteria, courts and legislatures will want 
to ensure that the vast majority of the population is considered 
competent, but that the requisite level of capacity is not set so 
low as to be meaningless (i.e., requiring almost no understand-
ing, appreciation or reasoning). 
One option is to use a fixed level of performance above 
which an individual would be considered competent to make 
all treatment decisions (e.g., understanding, appreciating 
and/or rationally manipulating 75% of the information present-
ed.)118 There are certain advantages to this alternative, in-
cluding greater consistency in application of the standards, and 
increased certainty on the part of medical professionals who 
116. These percentages are based on the assumption of essentially 
random choice in a state of incompetence. 
117. See discussion supra Part II. 
118. For example, instead of requiring a higher degree of capacity to 
consent to an appendectomy than to consent to an x-ray, once a patient 
met some fixed level of capacity she would be competent to consent to 
any medical treatment. A fixed standard is akin to a "rule" discussed 
below, whereas a sliding scale would entail application of a "standard." 
See the discussion infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text on rules 
versus standards. 
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need to decide which patients' decisions to accept.119 In addi-
tion, the possibility of manipulating the standards according to 
subjective judgments about a patient's choice is lessened. 
The use of a fixed level of performance, however, has a num-
ber of disadvantages. The standard may be insufficiently rigor-
ous because of the need to set the level of required capacity 
low in order to accommodate the majority of the population. 
On the other hand, the standard may be overly restrictive if 
the line is set too high in order to prevent any incapacitated 
people from making decisions. 
Instead of using a fixed level of competence, a sliding scale 
could be applied.120 This might allow competence determina-
tions to take into account the features of the patient's situa-
tion, which many commentators believe is desirable,121 in a 
less confusing manner than would result from varying the 
components which are included in the legal standard. For 
example, although a patient would be required to demonstrate 
both understanding and appreciation for all treatment deci-
sions, the level of understanding or appreciation may vary 
according to the specific context. A patient who shows minor 
impairments on the measures may be competent to make sim-
ple treatment decisions, but those same impairments would 
cause greater concern when the treatment decision involves 
more complex elements. Relevant factors to consider might 
include the number of treatment options and the amount of 
risk entailed in any one treatment option—risk being of 
greater importance than complexity. 
One author suggested that while a patient could consent to 
"conventional treatment without demonstrating a high degree 
of competency, a greater showing of competency [would be] 
appropriate when the intervention chosen is of questionable 
value and carries great risk."122 Although this would allow a 
119. NEJM, supra note 19, at 1637. 
120. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 96, at 60 (suggesting 
that the level of capacity should depend on the potential consequences of 
the patient's decision). 
121. See, e.g., id.; Drane, supra note 98, at 18. 
122. Bruce Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinc-
tion Between Assent and Objection, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 15, 43-44 (1991). 
Another author requires that physicians first determine whether a mental 
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great deal of flexibility, it is also highly subjective. How does 
one determine the "conventional" treatment? For example, if a 
patient in the end stage of terminal cancer refuses any inter-
vention (including simple antibiotics) would such action be 
considered conventional or unconventional?123 Likewise, de-
termining what treatments are of "questionable value" is also 
difficult. How should value be defined—extending life, easing 
pain, or effectuating a cure?124 What if a patient refuses a 
treatment that has a high probability of alleviating some of the 
symptoms (and thus prolonging life) but holds no hope of cure? 
Alternatively, what if the patient requests a treatment that 
has a low probability of alleviating symptoms but is the only 
procedure available? It would appear that considerations 
should include more than the economic cost-benefit ratio of a 
treatment, yet assigning a value to life, or quality of life, is 
fraught with difficulties. These arguments demonstrate the 
problems posed by requiring a greater showing of competence 
based upon amorphous factors such as unconventionality of 
treatment. 
Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock argue that the level of com-
petence should vary according to the "net balance of expected 
benefits and risks of the patient's choice in comparison with 
other alternatives," an approach that we find persuasive.125 
Although this approach does not avoid all of the difficulties 
identified above (as costs and benefits would still need to be 
identified and balanced against each other), it makes the need 
to address these issues explicit and insures that a patient's 
acceptance or refusal of treatment would only be circumstan-
tially relevant. Moreover, cost/benefit analyses (here performed 
by the physician) can be tailored to accord with individual 
disorder is present, then question whether the symptoms disable decision-
making, and finally whether the decision is dangerous. Robert P. Roca, 
Determining Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, 62 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1177, 1190 (1994) (demonstrating, in Figure 1, how the answers to 
these questions influence capacity determinations). 
123. Winick defines conventionality as what treatment would be gener-
ally recommended by a physician. See Winick, supra note 122, at 44. 
124. Winick looks at the risk/benefit ratio of the intervention in order 
to determine "questionable value." See id. 
125. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 7, at 52. 
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patient values, like mechanisms of substituted decisionmaking. 
Thus the physician may consider the patient's subjective val-
ues in determining what counts as a cost or a benefit. Accord-
ing to this model, when the net balance is substantially better 
than the alternatives, the patient need only demonstrate a low 
level of competence. When the balance is equal to the alterna-
tives, a moderate level of competence would be required; and 
when the balance is substantially worse, a high level of compe-
tence would be required.126 This avoids the need to establish 
which treatments are conventional, while at the same time it 
takes into account the fact that treatment refusal may be the 
most appropriate course of action. 
3. Qualitative Aspects of Applying the Standard 
It is as critical to determine which cognitive functions are 
impaired as it is to identify the overall level of impairment. 
For example, in a complex surgical procedure, substantial 
deficits in understanding the technical aspects of the operation 
may be common. If, however, a patient fails to understand a 
basic feature of the operation (e.g., that general anesthesia 
renders a person unconscious), such an individual should not 
be allowed to make the decision. At issue is not the degree or 
quantity of understanding,127 but the quality or content of un-
derstanding (i.e., what the patient understands).128 
Informed consent law requires that a patient's decision be 
voluntary, informed and competent.129 Each element, howev-
er, is not completely distinct from the others. For example, al-
though the right to information requirement is generally ap-
plied to assess the nature of the physician's disclosure to the 
patient,130 it also has implications for evaluations of compe-
tence. In other words, what the patient is required to under-
stand or appreciate is linked to what information the physician 
126. Id. at 53-57. See examples cited therein. 
127. Whether the patient understands the information well, moderately 
or poorly is not measured. See supra text accompanying note 121. 
128. The MacArthur data do not provide adequate information on this 
point since the study focused only on one form of consent disclosure for 
each patient. 
129. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 64, at 448; see also supra note 4. 
130. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 64, at 449. 
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is required to disclose. In this sense, competence standards can 
vary in accordance with the amount and complexity of informa-
tion involved. As a result, competence standards have a type of 
"built-in" sliding scale—more complex procedures involve in-
creasingly complex elements of information which may be more 
difficult to understand. The amount of information a patient is 
required to understand will affect whether that person is con-
sidered competent. For instance, if we take the voluntary hos-
pitalization example from above, patients would only be re-
quired to understand that they are entering a hospital and 
that discharge may not be automatic. They would not be ex-
pected to understand all the legal aspects of voluntary hospi-
talization or the details of the hospital's procedures for dealing 
with voluntary patients. 
Relying solely upon quantitative data (how much the patient 
understands) to evaluate competence may be inappropriate in 
some cases. There are certain aspects of understanding, appre-
ciation and reasoning that are so crucial to competent consent 
that allowing a person to make a treatment decision without 
these elements present would be inadvisable. A patient who 
scores above the "impaired" cut-off point on a given mea-
sure—that is, he or she has not scored in the lower range of 
the score distribution scale when compared to the rest of the 
population—arguably should still be considered incompetent if 
he or she has failed to demonstrate a particular capacity that 
is essential for competent decisionmaking. For example, a 
subject who is asked to enter a research protocol and under-
stands the procedure she is asked to participate in but fails to 
understand the distinction between ordinary treatment and 
research, should probably be considered incompetent to consent 
to participation in the experiment.131 
In summary, all three factors—which components are in-
cluded in a standard, how the standards are applied, and to 
what information the standards are applied—will affect compe-
tence determinations. Clearly more research on these issues is 
necessary before conclusively establishing a legal standard of 
competence. At present, it may be sufficient to note that for-
131. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Patients' Competence to Consent to 
Neurobiological Research, ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 241, 248 (1996). 
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mulating a legal standard of competence is somewhat context 
specific, and as a result, different situations may require differ-
ent application of those standards. 
Moreover, the debate here reflects the classic "rules versus 
standards" controversy in creation of laws. A "rule" is a precise 
legal instruction "which requires for its application nothing 
more than a determination of the happening or non-happening 
of physical or mental events" (e.g., the speed limit is 55 
mph).132 A "standard" is a less precise legal instruction 
"which requires a comparison of the quality or tendency of 
what happened in the particular instance with what is believed 
to be the quality or tendency of happenings in like situations" 
(e.g., no person should drive at an excessive speed).133 In the-
ory, the distinction between "rules" and "standards" (using the 
terms in their legal sense) is merely in the degree of specifici-
ty.134 In practice the issue is whether judges will determine 
the law ex post in creating precedent, or whether legislatures 
will determine the law ex ante in writing statutes, and whether 
one option is more desirable than the other.135 At issue here 
is how specific legislatures should be in drafting statutes (or 
courts in formulating case law) governing competence deter-
minations. There are several available options ranging from 
identifying general characteristics of acceptable decisions (e.g., 
"sufficient capacity to make or communicate responsible deci-
sions") to identifying the components of a competence standard 
(e.g., evidencing a choice, understanding and appreciation). In 
addition, the specificity of the nature and degree of perfor-
mance required to pass each component of the standard is in-
132. HENRY H. HART, J R . & ALBERT M. SACKS, T H E LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139 (1994). 
133. Id. at 140. In reality the distinction between "rules" and "stan-
dards" is not so clear-cut because the application of "rules" in certain 
circumstances entails some uncertainty. Id. at 139; see also H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 151-80 (1961) (discussing the "open-texture" of 
law). 
134. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analy-
sis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974) (discussing 
whether specificity or generality is more efficient in legal rulemaking). 
135. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992) (noting the distinction between 
whether the law will be deemed ex ante or ex post). 
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volved, as is how they may vary according to the degree of risk 
faced by the patient.136 Lack of specificity in statutes will 
mandate either judicial, medical or administrative determina-
tions of competence requirements. Resolving the dilemma be-
tween "rules" and "standards" is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. The MacArthur data do not provide specific guidance on 
this issue.137 Suffice it to say that lawmakers should carefully 
consider not only which of the four components identified in 
Part I should be included in a competence standard, but also 
the extent to which the application of those standards should 
be determined ahead of time, rather than left to judicial, or 
even medical, interpretation. 
B. What Procedures Should Be Used to Determine Incompe-
tence1? 
Competence determinations also raise procedural issues. For 
example, should patients routinely be screened in order to 
assess their decisionmaking capacity? What mechanism(s) 
should be used to determine competence, and what role should 
experts' opinions play in this process? The MacArthur data 
also provide guidance concerning these issues. 
1. Screening of Patients for Incompetence 
Whether a screening mechanism should be used routinely to 
assess patients' decisionmaking capacities depends on the cost 
of applying the procedure to the target population balanced 
against the benefit of identifying incompetent decisionmak-
136. Some states take this last approach for informed consent disclo-
sure requirements. See Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 212 (1994) (referring to lists published by the 
Louisiana Medical Disclosure Panel specifying the degree and form of dis-
closure for particular procedures). 
137. A number of authors have argued that the controversy should be 
decided on economic grounds, comparing the costs and benefits of legisla-
tive rules versus judge-made rules. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra 
note 134, at 261; Kaplow, supra note 135, at 562 (noting that rules are 
more costly for legislatures, whereas standards are more costly for legal 
advisors or enforcement authorities). To the extent that the MacArthur 
data provide information regarding the costs of competence determina-
tions, they may have some bearing on this issue. 
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ers.138 There are three factors that are crucial to this analy-
sis: first, the cost of screening will depend on the method cho-
sen; second, the degree of benefit will depend on the preva-
lence of incapacity in the population, or the base-rate; and 
third, the benefit will relate to the extent of harm avoided. For 
an unselected sample of the general population, competence 
screening is probably unwarranted because the incidence of 
incapacity, and the corresponding likelihood of an incompetent 
person making a binding decision, is relatively low. The 
MacArthur data show that the prevalence of incapacity is low 
even among the type of medical patients included in the study. 
It increases considerably, however, in the population of people 
with schizophrenia, especially those recently admitted to a hos-
pital.139 Even for this group, though, competence screening 
may not be economically feasible except for the more severely 
ill patients.140 Thus a maximally efficient screening process 
would focus only on patients who are clearly thought disor-
dered, delusional or otherwise severely mentally ill.141 As the 
risk inherent in a decision increases (e.g., a patient with 
138. Also important is the mechanism's effectiveness—i.e., its ability to 
appropriately identify impaired or incompetent patients. 
139. For any given measure, 25% of these patients scored in the "im-
paired" range compared to 5-7% of the angina patients and a mere 2% of 
the community subjects. When all measures are combined, 52% of pa-
tients with schizophrenia showed impairment on at least one measure, 
compared with 12% of angina patients and 4% of community subjects. 
For more information see supra notes 91 and 106. Note that the utility 
of screening in a general medical population will vary depending on the 
precise nature of that population, i.e., outpatients in a rheumatology 
clinic are likely to have fewer impairments of decisionmaking than stroke 
victims in an intensive care unit (ICU). Extrapolation to medical popula-
tions other than the one included in this study should be done cautiously 
with this variability in mind. 
140. Greater severity of certain psychiatric symptoms was correlated 
with greater impairment. MacArthur II, supra note 59 (Table 8—showing 
correlations between experimental measures and scores on the BPRS and 
BDI). 
141. For example, in Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990), the 
Supreme Court held that where a Florida statute required tha t a patient 
be competent to admit himself or herself into a psychiatric facility, hospi-
tal officials could be held liable for allowing the voluntary commitment of 
a patient who thought he was entering heaven instead of a hospital. 
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schizophrenia's decision to enter a high-risk research project), 
so does the justification for routine screening. 
An alternative screening method derived from the rationale 
that the usefulness of screening is proportionate to the risk in-
volved in patient decisionmaking is to focus on treatment 
refusers. Most medical professionals do not question the com-
petence of a patient who is consenting to treatment. This may 
be due to the clinician's unwillingness to question a patient's 
autonomy when the physician reasonably believes the patient 
is agreeing to a procedure that is in his or her best inter-
ests.142 On the other hand, it has been argued that rejection 
of treatment may function as a useful indicator of the need for 
a competence assessment.143 That is to say, only patients who 
are making choices that, in the judgment of their clinicians, 
threaten their medical welfare should be subjected to rigorous 
examination of their capacity to make treatment decisions.144 
142. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 7, at 57-58 ("[I]t is a 
reasonable assumption that physicians' treatment recommendations are 
more often than not in the interests of their patients. Consequently, it is 
in turn a reasonable presumption—although rebuttable in any particular 
instance—that a treatment refusal is contrary to the patient's interest." 
Id. at 58); Charles M. Culver, The Clinical Determination of Competence 
in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 277, 
282 (Kapp et al. eds., 1986) (arguing that a[i]t would rarely if ever be 
irrational for a patient to consent to a suggested treatment, because 
competent physicians rarely if ever suggest irrational treatments." Never-
theless, "[r]efusing a treatment can be either an irrational or a rational 
act."). 
143. See generally Steven K. Hoge et al., A Prospective, Multicenter 
Study of Patients' Refusal of Antipsychotic Medication, 47 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 949 (1990) (discussing the negative effects on patients who 
are deemed treatment refusers). 
144. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 7, at 22. Compare Riv-
ers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343-44 (N.Y. 1986) (requiring judicial review 
of patients who are thought to be incompetent and are refusing treat-
ment) with Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 
N.E.2d 308, 310 (Mass. 1983) (requiring judicial review of all competence 
determinations). 
Using treatment refusal as a sole screening indicator may result in 
a number of incapacitated patients being allowed to make decisions. For 
example, one study of psychiatric inpatients found that the incidence of 
treatment refusal was 7.2%. See Hoge, supra note 143, at 950. Compare 
this percentage with the percentages of subjects in the MacArthur study 
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All patients who refuse treatment are not per se incompetent, 
nor should formal screening mechanisms be applied to all non-
consenting patients, but rejection can be used as a means of 
identifying those patients whose competence should be exam-
ined further.145 
2. Making Decisions About Impaired Decisionmaking 
If impairment is suspected, who should decide whether the 
person should be allowed to make his or her own decision 
about treatment? The answer to this question probably de-
pends on the mechanism used to identify those presumed to be 
incompetent. In an acute psychiatric setting, use of widespread 
screening would probably preclude, on economic grounds, ex-
clusive reliance on judicial determinations of competence. Inca-
pacity would be determined and decisionmaking power allocat-
ed by some less formal process. Extrapolating from the 
MacArthur data, which demonstrated the presence of signifi-
cant impairments in half of the schizophrenic population, there 
would likely be a high incidence of hearings, especially involv-
ing patients with schizophrenia, representing a substantial 
burden if the judicial system were employed.146 On the other 
hand, judicial review limited to disputed capacity determina-
tions (i.e., appeals of initial findings) may be a more feasible 
alternative. While judicial mechanisms provide a significant 
degree of protection for individual rights, they also entail a 
number of disadvantages, including high cost and substantial 
delay.147 Thus they are reasonably efficient only in a system 
who showed decisionmaking impairments. See supra notes 91 and 106. 
Moreover, the high incidence of non-compliance with medication among 
seriously medically ill patients suggests that many more factors (besides 
competence) control t reatment refusal. 
145. Degree of risk associated with the patient's medical t reatment also 
may be sufficient to warrant competence screening, even when the pa-
tient shows no signs of a mental disorder and is consenting to t reatment . 
For example, it could be argued that patients faced with extremely high 
risk treatment alternatives (e.g., cancer patients) should be administered 
a competence screening device no matter what indicia are present. 
146. The exact frequency of positive findings of impairment for particu-
lar screening measures would depend on the factors discussed in the 
previous sections. The MacArthur data probably underestimate the prev-
alence of impairments among the various populations. See supra note 90. 
147. The President's Commission noted that "resorting to the courts to 
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that does not frequently require formal determinations of com-
petence. 
One of the primary concerns that led to the use of judicial 
mechanisms in the past was the mental health system's reli-
ance on unstructured methods of uncertain validity and reli-
ability for assessing decisionmaking capacities. Eventually 
technologies for structured assessment were developed but 
initial instruments either did not correspond closely enough to 
the articulated legal standards or failed reliably to identify 
relevant impairments. The instruments used in the MacArthur 
Study have been modified to create the MacArthur Competence 
Assessment Tool for Treatment ("MaeCAT-T") for use in a 
clinical setting.148 The MacCAT-T provides a standardized 
method for assessing patients' capacities to make treatment 
decisions, thereby reducing potential sources of clinician bias 
adjudicate incompetency . . . is often burdensome . . . [and] the proceed-
ings are in many cases so perfunctory and/or deferential to the profes-
sional expertise of providers that the role of the courts amounts to little 
more than pro forma ratification of what was readily apparent to health 
professionals." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 96, at 175. See also 
FADON & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 97-100 (1986) (noting that in-
formed consent requirements are more policy-oriented than legal); cf. 
Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the Competence of Mental 
Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DlEGO L. REV. 343, 431 (1995) 
(arguing that law-trained assessors (not necessarily judges) are needed to 
assure due process in competence hearings). Thus the Commission recom-
mended that "determinations of decisional incapacity be made at the in-
stitutional level and that lawmakers be encouraged to recognize the va-
lidity of such determinations." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 96, at 
175. See also Paul S. Appelbaum & Warren F. Schwartz, Minimizing the 
Social Cost of Choosing Treatment for the Involuntarily Hospitalized Men-
tally-Ill Patient: A New Approach to Defining the Patient's Role, 24 CONN. 
L. REV. 433 (1992) (arguing that the costs and benefits of possible ap-
proaches to substitute decisionmaking should be compared before selecting 
a particular model). The MacArthur data does not conclude that judicial 
hearings are inappropriate. In fact, judicial hearings may be more accu-
rate and may carry strong symbolic value. See Dennis E. Cichon, The 
Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse 
Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 395 (1992) (noting that "re-
search indicates that the adversarial process itself may be therapeutic"). 
148. See generally Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, MacArthur 
Competence Assessment Tool—Treatment ("MacCAT-T") (Draft Manual, on 
file with authors). 
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or inter-clinician disagreement regarding the patient's degree 
of capacity.149 Employed properly, this tool, or ones similar to 
it, may enable the utilization of nonjudicial mechanisms for 
ascertaining capacity and allocating decisionmaking power, 
thereby allowing greater reliance on the determinations of 
medical professionals.150 For example, if a consensus can be 
reached regarding the nature and degree of impairment that 
would constitute incompetence in a particular situation, the 
risk of error can be reduced since clinicians or non-judicial 
reviewers would have clear-cut data upon which to base their 
determinations of incompetence. Moreover, the use of identifi-
able data will also facilitate post hoc review of the process; in 
addition to a physician's testimony regarding the factors upon 
which she based her determination, there will also be test 
scores available as evidence of the degree of impairment. Even 
if judicial mechanisms are employed, the MacCAT-T or similar 
measures can provide a structured basis for judicial compe-
tence determinations. 
149. Test-retest data on the MacArthur instruments (used in the study 
reported here) from which the MacCAT-T was derived show that the 
tests can be scored reliably and that the tests measure abilities in a 
relatively stable manner. These tests are also sensitive to changes in 
mental status that would influence the manner in which these abilities 
are manifested in performance at a given time. See generally MacArthur 
II, supra note 59. 
150. Without additional data regarding the degree to which the mea-
sures correspond to legal determinations of competence, patients who 
score low might best be seen as at greater risk of failing to meet the 
threshold of ability associated with determinations of legal competence. 
See, e.g., Rains v. Belshe, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 201 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that a s tatute which "permits an initial nonjudicial determina-
tion of a patient's incompetence by a physician or surgeon," does not 
deny patients due process). 
Another option is to institute quasi-judicial competence hearings 
presided over by judicial masters or designated committees. States may 
want to establish special hearing boards similar to those used in New 
York for surrogate decisionmaking. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.01 
(McKinney 1995) (noting tha t "[t]he public interest [would] be served by 
the establishment of a statewide quasi-judicial . . . process, which would 
determine patient capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment"); 
see also Clarence Sundram, Informed Consent for Major Medical Treat-
ment of Mentally Disabled People, 318 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1368 (1988) 
(favorably evaluating the efficacy of the New York committee system). 
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It is important to note, however, that while scores below a 
certain point on the MacCAT-T or other functional measures 
may indicate problems in decisionmaking capacity, they do not 
in themselves mean that the patient is incompetent. Notwith-
standing the tests' ability to identify subjects with impair-
ments, low scores on any of the measures should not be taken 
as de facto determinants of incompetence. In this sense, pa-
tients who score low might be best seen as at greater risk (the 
lower the scores, the greater the risk) of failing to meet the 
threshold of ability associated with determinations of legal 
competence. As a result, more data are needed regarding the 
degree to which the measures correspond to legal determina-
tions of competence before recommending substantial reliance, 
in judicial or even less formal settings, on structured methods 
such as those used in the MacArthur study. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The MacArthur Treatment Competence study provides an 
important step towards developing usable legal standards of 
competence for medical decisionmaking by identifying a con-
ceptualization of competence that can be used to guide further 
endeavors. Moreover, the framework and issues this Article 
addresses can be used to formulate standards of competence 
for other areas of decisionmaking beyond the medical treat-
ment context.151 Although the need to standardize legal de-
terminations of competence is apparent, courts and legislatures 
should explore the policy implications of the various alterna-
tives before authorizing adoption of a particular standard in a 
given context. As the answers to the remaining questions be-
come clearer, we can move not only towards constructing us-
able standards, but also towards developing systematic proce-
dures for evaluating and determining competence in other 
legal domains. 
151. See, e.g., Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Com-
petence Study I: Development of a Research Instrument (draft manuscript, 
on file with authors, 1996); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Crimi-
nal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 
(1993) (discussing the various tests administered for assessing "compe-
tence" among criminal defendants and how the tests are based on con-
text). 
